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INTRODUCTION
In an increasingly common litigation strategy,1 plaintiffs in
laborers in the banana industries
of Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala and Panama, brought a class
action suit in Hawaii state court against Dole Food and other defen
dants.3 Plaintiffs brought only state law causes of action, alleging that
they had been harmed by Dole Food's use of DBCP, a toxic pesticide
banned from use in the United States.4 Dole Food removed the case to
federal district court seeking the procedural advantages of a federal
forum,5 as corporate defendants facing alien tort plaintiffs seeking re
dress for overseas conduct invariably do. The advantages Dole Food
sought from a federal forum included: stricter standing requirements,
stricter burdens of proof,6 and a more liberal standard for forum non
Patrickson v. Dole Food Company,2

1. See generally Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368 (11th Cir. 1998);
Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, A.G., 115 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 1997); Torres v. S. Peru Copper
Corp., 1 13 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 1997); Aquafaith Shipping v. Jarillas, 963 F.2d 806 (5th Cir.
1992); Alomang v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15908 (E.D. La. Oct. 17,
1996); Kern v. Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 525 (S.D. Tex. 1994); Sequihua v. Tex
aco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
2. 251 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 2001) (Kozinski, J.),
June 28, 2002) (No. 01-593).
3.

Id.

at 798.

4.

Id.

at 798-99.

cert. granted in part,

122 S. Ct. 2657 (U.S.

5. See Armin Rosencranz & Richard Campbell, Foreign Environmental and Human
Rights Suits Against U.S. Corporations in U.S. Courts, 18 STAN. ENYTL. L.J. 145, 189-90
(1999).
6.

Id.

at 190.
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conveniens dismissal.7 Of these, federal forum non conveniens doc
trine was, arguably, Dole Food's strongest weapon. A forum non con
veniens dismissal that forces plaintiffs to seek recovery in Central
American courts, as was the case in Patrickson, generally equates to a
victory for a corporate defendant.8 As is often the case, the district
court granted Dole Food's motion to dismiss based on forum non con
veniens.9
On appeal, plaintiffs sought to void the removal to federal court,
and the subsequent dismissal, by arguing that the district court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction.10 Plaintiffs chose to file suit in Hawaii state
court in order to avoid removal based on diversity jurisdiction,11 forc
ing Dole Food to argue that a federal question was raised by the com7. See id. at 179-80 (discussing federal forum non conveniens doctrine in this context);
see also Kathryn Lee Boyd, The Inconvenience of Victims: Abolishing Forum Non Conveni
ens in U.S. Human Rights Litigation, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 41, 44-49 (1998) (providing an over
view of how defendants use forum non conveniens to dismiss human rights cases in federal
court); Rosencranz & Campbell, supra note 5, at 188 n.266 (noting that although many states
are adopting the strict federal approach to forum non conveniens, many others have explic
itly rejected this strict view).
8. A forum non conveniens dismissal in federal court assumes that another court exists
with jurisdiction. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 506-07 (1947). A foreign plaintiff's
choice of a federal forum is given less deference than a citizen's choice of a federal forum.
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 256 (1981). Further, when determining whether
forum non conveniens dismissal is appropriate, federal courts consider two sets of factors:
private interests - proximity and accessibility of evidence, availability of compulsory proc
ess for witnesses, travel costs for witnesses, possibility of viewing relevant property, and the
enforceability of any resulting judgment - and public interests - docket control, burden
upon local citizens for jury duty, interest in having cases decided in the locality in which they
arose, and difficulty for the court in applying foreign substantive law. Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at
508-09. The public interest factors weigh heavily against foreign plaintiffs in situations such
as those that arose in Patrickson because most of the evidence, property, and witnesses are
abroad and foreign law probably governs such cases. As many of the courts in Central
America are notoriously deferential toward corporate misconduct, forum non conveniens
dismissals for Patrickson type plaintiffs generally terminate any effective redress for them.
See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 688-89 (Tex. 1990) ("When a
court dismisses a case against a United States multinational corporation, it often removes the
most effective restraint on corporate misconduct. . . . The parochial perspective embodied in
the doctrine of forum non conveniens enables corporations to evade legal control merely
because they are transnational."); Jacqueline Duval-Major, Note, One- Way Ticket Home:
The Federal Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens and the International Plaintiff, 77 CORNELL
L. REV. 650 (1992) (discussing the impact of forum non conveniens doctrine on international
plaintiffs).
9.
10.

Patrickson,

251 F.3d at 798.

Id.

1 1. See id. at 798 n.1; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)l (1994) (stating that a corporation is a
citizen of its state of incorporation and of its principle place of business); 28 U.S.C. § 144l(b)
(stating that a defendant may not remove to federal court on diversity of citizenship grounds
if defendant is a citizen of the state in which the case was brought); 15 MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE ch. 102 (3d ed. 1998) (providing general discussion of diversity jurisdiction). Ad
ditionally, Hawaiian courts have not yet settled their forum non conveniens doctrine, leaving
room for plaintiffs to press their case. See David W. Robertson & Paula K. Speck, Access to
State Courts in Transnational Personal Injury Cases: Forum Non Conveniens and Antisuit
Injunctions, 68 TEXAS L. REV. 937, 950-53 (1990).

\
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plaint.12 Dole Food responded that the complaint implicated the fed
eral common law of foreign relations,13 thereby raising federal ques
tion subject matter jurisdiction ("federal question jurisdiction").14 The
Nimh Circuit rejected this argument, holding that the district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and remanded the case to Hawaii
state court.15
In so holding, the Ninth Circuit split with the Torres v. Southern
Peru Copper Corp . 16 line of cases ("the Torres approach") from the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits.17 In Torres, 700 Peruvian miners brought
12. Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 798; see 15 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 103 (3d ed.
1 998) (providing general discussion of federal question jurisdiction); see also infra Section
I.A.1 (discussing federal question jurisdiction).
13. Unlike state courts, federal courts do not have broad powers to develop common
law, but they may develop common law in matters delegated to the federal government by
the Constitution. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("Except in matters gov
erned by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case
is the law of the State . . . . There is no federal general common law."). Once made, federal
common law, via the Supremacy Clause, pre-empts state law. See Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1972) (holding federal common law has the same status as
federal statutory law). Unlike constitutional decisions, Congress may overrule federal com
mon law by statute. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 315-32 (1981) (holding
that congressional pollution act overrules previous federal common law pollution claims).
Generally, federal courts are hesitant to make federal common law, recognizing that Con
gress should make such decisions. See Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63,
68 (1966). Nevertheless, federal courts will create and apply federal common law in two gen
eral areas: (1) those where Congress has left the development of the law to the courts and
(2) those areas where a uniquely federal interest is at stake and there is no applicable federal
statute. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981). Federal com
mon law of foreign relations is an example of the second category of federal common law.
Federal common law of foreign relations seldom, if ever, entirely pre-empts state causes of
action. Rather, it supplies the governing standard for certain foreign affairs issues that arise
within the context of state causes of action. For example, in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sab
batino, only the issue of the validity of Cuba's expropriation decree was governed by the
federal common law of foreign relations. The other elements of the underlying conversion
tort remained governed by state law. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 439 (1964). See infra Sec
tion l.A.2 for a discussion of federal common law of foreign relations.
14.

Patrickson,

15.

Id.

251 F.3d at 799.

at 804-05, 808-09.

16. 113 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding federal question jurisdiction extends to state
causes of action brought by foreign plaintiffs when the litigation affects important sovereign
and economic interests of foreign states); see also Republic of Venezuela v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 287 F.3d 192, 199 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (recognizing the existence of this circuit split).
17. See Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1377-78 ( 11th Cir. 1998) (apply
ing the Torres approach, but finding no federal question jurisdiction); Marathon Oil Co. v.
Ruhrgas, A.G., 115 F.3d 315, 320 (5th Cir. 1997) (same), vacated on other grounds, 145 F.3d
211 (5th Cir. 1998) (en bane), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 526 U.S. 574 (1999);
Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (holding federal question jurisdic
tion extends to state causes of action brought by foreign plaintiffs that implicate important
interests for foreign sovereigns when the foreign sovereign is not a party to the litigation);
Kern v. Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 525, 531-32 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (indicating in
dicta that federal question jurisdiction extends to state causes of action brought by class
action plaintiffs, including Americans, that implicate important interests for foreign sover
eigns when the foreign sovereign is not a party to the litigation); Grynberg Prod. Corp. v.
British Gas, P.L.C., 817 F. Supp. 1338, 1355-57 (E.D. Tex. 1 993) (holding federal question
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state tort causes of action in Texas state court against an American
multinational mining corporation.18 The defendant, Southern Peru
Copper Corporation ("SPCC"), removed to federal court and was
granted a forum non conveniens dismissal.19 As in Patrickson, the
Torres plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the federal district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction.20 The government of Peru, although
not a party to the dispute, filed statements in opposition to the
plaintiffs' case with the State Department and with the court.21 The
Fifth Circuit found that federal question jurisdiction existed in this
case, thus the removal and the subsequent dismissal were proper.22
This Note argues that foreign plaintiffs should be able to sue
American multinational corporations in state courts. Part I advances
the most charitable readings of both the Torres approach and the
Patrickson challenge to that view. Part II contends that while the
Patrickson court reaches the correct result, it fundamentally misinter
prets the Torres approach, thereby failing to attack the core deficien
cies of the Torres approach. Part III argues that the foreign sovereign
conduct approach, an alternative analysis of the federal common law
of foreign relations, best reflects established case law. This Note con
cludes that providing foreign plaintiffs an opportunity to seek redress
in state courts fosters corporate responsibility among American multi
national companies.
I.

FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS: EXPANSIVE
AND RESTRICTIVE JURISDICTIONAL VIEWS

Corporate defendants such as SPCC and Dole Food often rely
upon expansive notions of federal question jurisdiction to remove
cases to federal court, in an effort to avoid an on the merits defense of
their conduct abroad. Part I advances the most charitable readings of
the Torres and Patrickson resolutions of this issue. Section I.A pro
vides a doctrinal argument on behalf of the Torres approach. Section
LB presents the doctrinal arguments implicitly relied upon by the Pa
trickson court.
jurisdiction extends to state causes of action brought by an American plaintiff that implicate
important interests for a foreign sovereign when the foreign sovereign is not a party to the
litigation); see also In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig., 114 F. Supp. 2d
939, 942-44 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (citing Torres as authority for extending federal common law of
foreign relations to issues involving American plaintiffs suing Japanese corporations
under state tort law).
1 8.

Torres,

1 13 F.3d at 541.

19. Id. at 541-42.
20. Id. at 542.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 543-44.

No Longer Safe at Home
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The Torres Approach

The Torres approach extends federal question jurisdiction to state
causes of action that significantly affect the vital economic and sover
eign interests of foreign states, even when a foreign sovereign is not a
party to the litigation.23 The Torres court presents precious little argu
ment itself in support of its extension of federal question jurisdiction,
citing only two supporting cases and devoting merely one page of the
Federal Reporter to the approach.24 This section formulates a doctrinal
defense on behalf of the Torres approach. Although this approach is
ultimately untenable, this Section argues that it is best understood as a
specific application of the well-pleaded complaint rule that is triggered
when two additional criteria are met: (1) the foreign government in
volved lodges a protest with the court and (2) both the plaintiffs and
the injuries complained of are of foreign origin.25
1.

The Torres Approach's Consistency with the Well-Pleaded
Complaint Rule

The Fifth Circuit views the Torres approach as "a very specific ap
plication of the well-pleaded complaint rule,"26 noting that, even
within the erudite realm of federal common law of foreign relations,
the well-pleaded complaint rule applies.27 As such, proponents of the
Torres approach do not view it as an exception to the well-pleaded
complaint rule, as its opponents contend,28 but rather as an independ
ent corollary to it.29

23.

Id.

at 542-43.

24. Id. One of the cited cases, Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc. , 451 U.S.
630 (1981 ), is cited only to support the proposition that federal courts can make federal
common Jaw - not particularly specific grounds for support. See Patrickson v. Dole Foods
Co., 251 F.3d 795, 801 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing this point).
25. Some courts have not presented the Torres approach in this fashion. See Patrickson,
251 F.3d at 801-05; In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litig., 100 F. Supp. 2d
31, 35-38 (D.D.C. 2000).
26. Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, A.G., 115 F.3d 315, 320 (5th Cir. 1997). Contra
251 F.3d at 801 (characterizing the Torres approach as an exception to the well
pleaded complaint rule).

Patrickson,

27. Aquafaith Shipping, Ltd. v. Jarillas, 963 F.2d 806, 808 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding fed
eral common law of foreign relations raised as a defense insufficient for a finding of federal
question jurisdiction).
28.

See infra

Section I.B.l.

29. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 22 (1983)
(citing Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'! Assn. of Machinists, 367 F.2d 337, 339-40
(6th Cir. 1967), affd, 390 U.S. 557 (1968)).
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All grants of federal question jurisdiction are subject to the well
pleaded complaint rule.3° Following the rule, only issues raised in a
plaintiff's complaint can establish federal question jurisdiction.31 Thus
in Torres, defenses raised by SPCC that rely upon federal law supply
an insufficient foundation for establishing federal question jurisdic
tion.32 The well-pleaded complaint rule makes the plaintiff "the master
of the claim," allowing the plaintiff to avoid federal question jurisdic
tion - and a federal forum - by alleging only state claims.33 The
Torres and Patrickson plaintiffs took this approach.34 Nevertheless, in
an effort to investigate potentially artfully pied complaints, the Torres
court felt obliged to look past the face of the complaint to determine if
the federal common law of foreign relations was implicated by the
plaintiff's claims. 35
Although the court does not provide a robust defense of this view,
doctrinal support for the court's action is forthcoming.36 Congress
codified its general grant of federal question jurisdiction in Title 28
United States Code § 1331.37 "Although the language of § 1331 paral
lels that of the 'Arising Under' Clause of Art. III, [the Supreme] Court
never has held that statutory 'arising under' jurisdiction is identical to
Art. III 'arising under' jurisdiction."38 The Court interprets § 1 331 as
granting a much narrower scope of federal question jurisdiction than

30. Kenneth C. Randall,
L. REV. 349, 370 (1988).

Federal Questions and the Human Rights Paradigm,

73 MINN.

31. See Louisville & Nashville Rail Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (establishing
the rule).
32. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986).
33. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
34. Patrickson v. Dole Foods Co., 251 F.3d 795, 799 (9th Cir. 2001); Torres v. S. Peru
Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540, 541 (5th Cir. 1997).
35. Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, A.G., 115 F.3d 315, 320 (5th Cir. 1997); Torres, 1 13
F.3d at 542; see also Federated Dep't Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 397 n.2 (1981);
Grynberg Prod. Corp. v. British Gas, P.L.C., 817 F. Supp. 1338, 1354 (E.D. Tex. 1993).
36. Defendant in Torres reached federal court by removal from state court. Torres, 1 13
F.3d at 541-42. Cases filed in state court may be removed to federal court if the defendant so
elects, and the case originally could have been filed in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)
(1994). See 16 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 107 (3d ed. 1998) (providing general discus
sion of removal doctrine). Assuming personal jurisdiction, a case may only be originally filed
in federal court if the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the issue). See, e.g. , FED. R.
CIV. P. 12h(3). As such, the analysis for determining legitimate removal to federal court is
identical to the subject matter jurisdiction analysis applied to cases originally filed in a fed
eral court. See 16 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 107.14 (3d ed. 1998).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994). For the remainder of this Note the term "federal question
jurisdiction" will refer to the statutory grant of jurisdiction, namely 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Refer
ence to the broad scope of the constitutional grant of federal question jurisdiction will be
made by explicit reference the Constitution.
38. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 494 (1983).
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the Constitution permits.39 The Court has established two independent
tests for meeting the § 1331 grant of jurisdiction: (1) the plaintiff's
cause of action was created by federal law ("Holmes test")40 and (2)
vindication of plaintiff's state cause of action necessarily requires the
construction of federal law ("necessary construction test").41
Plaintiffs in Torres rely exclusively upon state causes of action;
hence, the Holmes test is inapplicable in this instance.42 As such, SPCC
pursued federal jurisdiction via the necessary construction test.43 Even
though the Supreme Court has stated that this test should be applied
with caution, as this realm of jurisdiction lies at the outer reaches of

39. Id. The Constitution prescribes the limits of subject matter jurisdiction for the fed
eral courts. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. As a matter of Constitutional law, the scope of federal
question jurisdiction, jurisdiction "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States," is quite broad. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738, 822-23
(1824) (holding that any federal "ingredient" is sufficient to satisfy the Constitution's federal
question jurisdiction parameters). Despite this broad constitutional scope, the Constitution
is not self-executing in this regard. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807
(1986). Congress retains broad control of the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts, and it
may grant a narrower scope of subject matter jurisdiction than is found in Article I l l . See,
e.g. , Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power Over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27
VILL. L. REV. 1030 (1982) (espousing the traditional view that Congress is not required by
Article I l l to vest full Constitutional subject matter jurisdiction in the inferior federal
courts). Contra Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two
Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 209 (1985) (arguing that Congress must
vest some of the Article III heads of jurisdiction in the federal judiciary); see also Laurence
Tribe, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering: Zoning Disfavored Rights Out of the Federal Courts,
16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 129 (1981) (arguing that there are non-Article III limits to
Congress's discretion in vesting inferior federal courts with subject matter jurisdiction). Ex
ercising this control over inferior courts, Congress withheld general federal question jurisdic
tion from them until 1875. See Judiciary Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470; Randall,
supra note 30, at 363, 365 n.76 (stating that the 1875 Act was the first general congressional
grant of federal question jurisdiction to the inferior federal courts and that it is the predeces
sor statute to § 1331, the current statutory grant of federal question jurisdiction).
40. The Court has long held that a suit arises under federal law if federal law creates the
plaintiff's cause of action ("the Holmes test"). Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co.,
241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916) (Holmes, J.). The majority of federal question jurisdiction cases fall
within this category. Merrell Dow Pharm., 478 U.S. at 808. The Holmes test best operates as
a rule of inclusion not exclusion (i.e., it provides a sufficient, but not necessary, ground for
federal question jurisdiction); T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1 964)
(Friendly, J.); see also Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9
(1983).
41. Merrell Dow Pharm., 478 U.S. at 808-09. Some courts and commentators have sug
gested a three way partition of federal question jurisdiction, adding claims arising under fed
eral common law as the third prong. See, e.g. , T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 828 (2d Cir. 1964).
However, the Court continues to apply the two-prong approach. Merrell Dow Pharm. , 478
U.S. at 808-09. Cases arising under federal common law are treated, for § 1331 jurisdictional
purposes, just like statutory law. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972).
This two test approach to issues of federal question jurisdiction is the conventional, 'black
letter,' approach. See 15 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 103.31 (3d ed. 1998).
42.

See Torres

43.

See

v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 1 13 F.3d 540, 541 (5th Cir. 1997).

Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199 (1921).
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§ 1331,44 the Fifth Circuit found that the Torres complaint passed in

this case.45
The Fifth Circuit's well-pleaded complaint rule analysis invoked
the ban on "artfully plead" complaints.46 "[I]t is an independent cor
ollary of the well-pleaded complaint rule that a plaintiff may not de
feat removal by omitting to plead necessary federal questions in a
complaint."47 A plaintiff, then, may not escape federal question juris
diction by artfully pleading a federal claim in state law terms.48 Federal
courts have an obligation to investigate complaints to determine if a
complaint alleging only state law causes of action actually is founded
upon federal law.49 In Torres, SPCC, relying upon this judicial duty,
contended that the plaintiffs artfully pied their complaint to avoid ad
dressing federal common law of foreign relations.50 As such, the exten
sion of federal question jurisdiction did not violate the well-pleaded
complaint rule - as long as the federal common law of foreign rela
tions was applicable.51
44. Merrell Dow Pharm., 478 U.S. at 810; see also Christianson v. Colt. Indus. Operating
Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808 (1988) (holding that plaintiff's right to relief must necessarily de
pend upon the "resolution of a substantial question of federal law") (internal citation omit
ted); Smith, 255 U.S. at 199 (holding cases that present issues merely colorable as federal or
unreasonably relying upon federal law are not proper grounds for federal question jurisdic
tion).
45.

Torres,

46.

See id.

1 13 F.3d at 543.

at 542.

47. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 22 (1983).
48. See Aquafaith Shipping v. Jarillas, 963 F.2d 806, 808 (5th Cir. 1992); Grynberg Prod.
Corp. v. British Gas, P.L.C., 817 F. Supp. 1338, 1353-54 (E.D. Tex. 1993).
49. See Federated Dep't Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 397 n.2 (1981);
817 F. Supp. at 1354.

Grynberg Prod.

Corp,

50.

See Torres,

1 13 F.3d at 542.

51. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 22. A recent district court opinion has questioned the
validity of Torres' reasoning in this regard. Navarro v. Bell Helicopter Services, Inc., No.
Civ.A.3:00-CV-2005-D, 2001 WL 454558, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2001) (stating that re
moval by way of the necessary construction test is no longer available in the Fifth Circuit).
Navarro relies upon Fifth Circuit precedent in forming this unsupportable view. Waste
Control Specialists, L.L.C. v. Envirocare of Texas, Inc., 199 F.3d 781, 783-84 (5th Cir. 2000)
(citing Rivet v. Regions Bank of Louisiana, 522 U.S. 470 (1998)). In Rivet, the Court re
versed the Fifth Circuit's determination that federal question jurisdiction extended to cases
in which the defendant sought to present a federal res judicata defense. Rivet, 522 U.S. at 478
("In sum, claim preclusion by reason of a prior federal judgment is a defensive plea that pro
vides no basis for removal under § 1441(b). Such a defense is properly made in the state pro
ceedings. . . . "). Jn Waste Control, plaintiffs presented state anti-trust claims. Upon removal
defendant argued that one of the claims was pre-empted by federal anti-trust law. Waste
Control, 199 F.3d at 782. The Fifth Circuit found the removal void because "[t]he artful
pleading doctrine allows removal where federal Jaw completely pre-empts a plaintiff's state
law claim." Id. at 783 (quoting Rivet, 522 U.S. at 475). The Fifth Circuit stated that this has
been the circuit rule since at least 1995. Id. at 784. Rivet and Waste Control do not compel
Navarro's holding, as the court itself admits. Navarro, 2001 WL 454558, at *3 ("[T]he Waste
Control Specialists panel did not state explicitly that the substantial federal question doctrine
can never support removal jurisdiction absent complete preemption, its reasoning leaves lit
tle room for doubt."). First, pre-emption cases arise in federal question jurisdiction by way
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The Torres Approach's Use of the Federal Common Law of
Foreign Relations

In Torres, SPCC presented the novel, but ultimately flawed, argu
ment that the plaintiffs' complaint implicated the federal common law
of foreign relations.s2 SPCC argued that this was the case because
Peru's vital economic and sovereign interests were at stake.s3 SPCC
was the largest mining company in Peru, an industry that accounted
for fifty percent of Peru's export income and eleven percent of its
gross domestic product.s4 The court accepted, without citing any
authority, SPCC's view that a vital, Peruvian economic interest was at
stake.ss The court found, again without citing authority, that the sover
eign interests of Peru were involved because it owned the land upon
which SPCC mined, owned the extracted minerals, granted SPCC con
cessions, and actually owned the mining refinery itself until 1994.s6 The
court held, citing only R epublic of the Philippines v. Marcos,s7 that
of the Holmes test, not the necessary construction test as in the Torres approach. See Rivet,
522 U.S. at 476 (quoting Caterpillar, Inc., v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987)). Hence, nei
ther Rivet or Waste Control directly applies to the Torres approach. The fact that the rule
espoused in Waste Control dates to at least 1995, two years prior to Torres, reinforces the
view that the "complete pre-emption rule" does not apply to the Torres approach. Second,
the Supreme Court in Rivet did not state that complete pre-emption was the only situation in
which the artfully plead doctrine applies. Rather, it stated the artfully plead doctrine applies
in pre-emption cases only when the pre-emption is complete. See Rivet, 522 U.S. at 476. Fed
eral common law of foreign relations seldom presents pre-emption issues at all. See supra
note 13 and infra note 146. Federal common law of foreign relations issues tend to mimic the
scenario in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986), where pre
emption is not at issue, but the plaintiff's state claims necessarily rely upon federal law to
adjudicate elements of the state claim. See infra Section II.Al. This rule for pre-emption
cases does not apply to the Torres approach. Finally, since the necessary construction test is
a well established rule of law, see supra note 43 and accompanying text, it is doubtful that the
Rivet Court meant to signal a radical change in the law by its passing statement of the com
plete pre-emption rule. See Rivet, 522 U.S. at 475.
52. Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 1 13 F.3d 540, 542 (5th Cir. 1997); see also Jack L.
Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1620-21
(1997) [hereinafter Goldsmith, Federal Courts] (outlining the justification for the conven
tional expansive view of federal common law of foreign relations). The conventional view
holds that the Constitution entrusts foreign relations powers exclusively with the federal po
litical branches. Id. at 1620. On occasion, in the absence of federal action the states will at
tempt to act in this arena either by direct political action or by allowing state law to govern
litigation impacting upon foreign relations. Id. As in dormant commerce clause cases, the
federal judiciary prohibits state action in such cases in order to protect the uniquely federal
interest in conducting foreign affairs by creating federal common law. Id. at 1620-21.
53.

Torres,

54.

Id.

1 13 F.3d at 542.

at 543.

55. Id. In contrast, three weeks later, in Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, A.G., 115 F.3d
315, 320 (5th Cir. 1997), the same panel distinguished Torres by refusing to extend federal
question jurisdiction to a German gas supplier as the court was unconvinced that a vital eco
nomic interest of Germany was at stake.
56.

Torres,

113 F.3d at 543.

57. 806 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1986).
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these two Peruvian interests raised important American foreign policy
concerns, thereby implicating the federal common law of foreign rela
tions.58 Following the Torres approach, when a complaint strikes at the
vital economic and sovereign interests of a foreign state, the federal
common law of foreign relations is implicated, giving rise to federal
question jurisdiction. 59
This decision represents an unprecedented, and in the end unsup
portable, extension of federal jurisdiction, yet the Torres court pro
vides only two short paragraphs (containing mostly facts about the
Peruvian mining industry) in support.60 Nevertheless, it is possible to
advance a doctrinal argument in support of this approach. The United
States Supreme Court ended the era of general federal common law in
diversity jurisdiction in 1938, in Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins.61 Never
theless, in a case decided on the same day as Erie - and in an opinion
by Erie's author - the Court upheld the use of federal common law in
an interstate waterway case - a case, like Torres, arising under fed
eral question jurisdiction.62 The Court currently authorizes the crea
tion of federal common law within two areas: (1) where the federal
government has constitutional authority and Congress has allowed the
federal courts to develop the law (e.g., admiralty), and (2) where the
federal government has constitutional authority and a federal rule of
decision is necessary to protect an uniquely federal interest.63 SPCC
relied upon the federal common law of foreign relations that falls
within the second category; our attention turns there.
In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,64 the first case to address
the federal common law of foreign relations doctrine,65 the Supreme
58. Torres, 113 F.3d at 543 n.8 (citing Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d
344, 352 (2d Cir. 1986), cert denied, 481 U.S. 1048 (1987)). In Marcos, the newly installed
Aquino regime sought to recover government funds absconded by former President Marcos
and invested in New York City real estate. The Philippines brought state causes of action in
New York state court. The case was removed. The Second Circuit affirmed the district
court's finding that the federal common law of foreign relations should govern the complaint
because important foreign policy issues were implicated.
59. Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1377 (11th Cir. 1998); Marathon Oil,
115 F.3d at 320; Torres, 1 13 F.3d at 543 n.8. Contra In re Tobacco/Governmental Health
Care Costs Litigation, 100 F. Supp. 2d 31, 36 (D.D.C. 2000) (characterizing this element of
the Torres approach as applying to complaints that impact "vital economic or sovereign in
terests" (emphasis added)). In re Tobacco appears to be a misstatement of this element of
the Torres approach. This Note accepts the Torres line of cases characterizing the impact as
"vital economic and sovereign interests," as this line of cases established the rule and indubi
tably uses "and" as opposed to "or."
60.

Torres,

113 F.3d at 543.

61. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (Brandeis, J.).
62. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 1 10 (1938)
(Brandeis, J.); see also Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 ( 1 943) (articulating
the limits ofjudiciary's power to make federal common law).
63. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640-41 (1981).
64. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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Court held that the federal common law of foreign relations must pro
vide the governing standard for international law issues, even in diver
sity cases, to protect the uniquely federal interest in conducting for
eign affairs from potentially parochial and divergent judgments of the
several states.66 (Although federal common law of foreign relations is
often implicated by state causes of action, it seldom pre-empts state
causes of action entirely; rather, it governs specific foreign affairs is
sues within the context of the state cause of action.67) Following
Sabbatino, the Second Circuit, in Marcos, expanded federal common
law of foreign relations to govern issues that "directly and significantly
affect American foreign relations."68 Conventionally, this line of cases
has come to stand for the proposition that federal courts can make
federal common law in nearly all areas significantly affecting interna
tional affairs.69 Despite this strong conventional view, neither the
Sabbatino nor the Marcos decision held that litigation affecting vital
economic and sovereign interests significantly affects American for-

65. In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litig., 100 F. Supp. 2d 31, 35
(D.D.C. 2000); see also Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 52, at 1625-30 (arguing that
federal common law of foreign relations arises from the Sabbatino decision, which was
founded upon protecting an uniquely federal interest).
66.

Sabbatino, 376

U.S. 398, 424-26 (1964).

67. For example, in Sabbatino only the issue of the validity of Cuba's expropriation de
cree was governed by federal common law of foreign relations. The other elements of the
underlying conversion tort remain governed by state law. See id. at 439. Similarly, only the
issue of the validity of the Filipino executive order in Marcos is governed by federal common
law of foreign relations. See Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 353-54 (2d Cir.
1986).
68. Marcos, 806 F.2d at 352. But see Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795, 801-02
(9th Cir. 2001) (arguing that an alternative reading of Marcos, extending federal question
jurisdiction because the validity of an act of a foreign sovereign is in question, is the best in
terpretation). However, the courts and commentators have not accepted the reading sug
gested in Patrickson. See, e.g. , Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61, 62 (S.D. Tex. 1994);
Grynberg Prod. Corp. v. B ritish Gas, P.L.C., 817 F. Supp. 1338, 1355 (E.D. Tex. 1993);
Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 52, at 1636.
69. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981); Goldsmith,
Federal Courts, supra note 52, at 1632-36; A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and
International Cases, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 15-19 (1995). This conventional reading of
Sabbatino, when coupled with the holding of Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100

(1972) (federal courts have jurisdiction under § 1331 for cases arising under federal common
law), has the potential to greatly expand federal question jurisdiction beyond its traditional
boundaries. Weisburd, supra, at 20 (noting that the amount of commercial activity with some
tie to foreign affairs is vast). This reading of Sabbatino has not gone without criticism, how
ever. See, e.g. , Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 800 (arguing that Sabbatino is best read as a choice of
law decision within the Erie doctrine, because jurisdiction in Sabbatino was based on diver
sity of citizenship, rendering federal question jurisdiction unnecessary); Jack I. Garvey, Judi
cial Foreign Policy-Making in International Civil Litigation: Ending the Charade of Separa
tion of Powers, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 461, 474-82 (1993) (arguing that Sabbatino

properly instructs federal courts to refrain from engaging in foreign policy issues);
Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 52, at 1690-98 (outlining the detrimental impact of
this reading of Sabbatino); Weisburd, supra, at 20-27 (arguing that the "foreign means fed
eral" approach is too broad).
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eign relations.70 The Torres court, by finding that these interests do
implicate significant foreign affairs issues, expanded federal common
law of foreign relations doctrine beyond its traditional limits.71
3.

Protest by a Foreign Nation is Necessary to Trigger the Torres
Approach

Not every case implicating vital economic and sovereign interests
of foreign states properly calls for federal question jurisdiction under
the Torres approach. Proponents of the Torres approach contend that
two triggering criteria must be met as well.72 These criteria are concep
tually distinct from the well-pleaded complaint rule and federal com
mon law elements of the Torres approach, because the triggering
criteria perform a restrictive function. That is to say, the Torres ap
proach expands federal question jurisdiction while the triggering
criteria limit the range of cases to which the approach might otherwise
be applied.
For the Torres extension of federal question j urisdiction to apply,
it is necessary, but not sufficient, for the foreign government to lodge a
protest with the court.73 In Torres and Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas,
A. G.,74 Peru and Germany, respectively, filed amicus briefs with the
court in opposition to the litigation.75 The Fifth Circuit found that this
involvement by the foreign sovereigns did "not, standing alone, create
a question of federal law."76 Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit, in
Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Co.,77 stated that, without a protest from
the foreign nation involved, it was reluctant to find that the plaintiff's
claims implicated important foreign policy issues that provide grounds
for federal question jurisdiction.78 Although the court provided no

70.

In re Tobacco,

71.

See id.

100 F. Supp. 2d at 35-36.

72. See Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1377-78 (11th Cir. 1998);
Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, A.G., 1 15 F.3d 315, 320 (5th Cir. 1997); Torres v. S. Peru
Copper Corp., 1 13 F.3d 540, 542-43 (5th Cir. 1997). The term triggering criteria is the
author's, not the courts'. As argued infra, these criteria limit the range of cases to which the
approach might otherwise be applied.
73. Pacheco de Perez, 139 F.3d at 1378 (finding Venezuela's lack of protest indicative
that no significant foreign relations issues are at stake); Marathon Oil, 115 F.3d at 320 (find
ing Germany's protest of the suit not sufficient grounds for j urisdiction); Torres, 1 13 F.3d at
542-43 (finding Peru's protest alone insufficient grounds for j urisdiction).
74. 1 1 5 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 1997).
75.

Marathon Oil,

76.

Torres,

115 F.3d at 320; Torres, 113 F.3d at 542-43.

113 F.3d at 542-43.

77. 139 F.3d 1368 (1 1th Cir. 1998).
78.

Id.

at 1378.
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doctrinal rationale for this decision,79 the court reasoned that Vene
zuela's lack of protest was "significant" as an indication that substan
tial foreign policy concerns were not raised by the complaint.80
4.

Foreign Plaintiffs Injured on Foreign Soil Necessary to Trigger

Torres Approach
The Torres extension of federal question jurisdiction applies only
when foreign plaintiffs seek recovery for injuries that occurred entirely
on foreign soil.81 None of the courts that adhere to the Torres ap
proach cite any authority for this proposition or provide any other ar
gumentation in defense of this triggering criterion.82 Perhaps the best
defense is that it represents a federalism concern. Namely, suits
brought under state law to recover for wrongs that occurred within the
state's territory should remain, absent diversity jurisdiction, in state
court as a matter of judicial federalism.83
B.

The

Patrickson Challenge

Although the fact patterns in Torres and Patrickson are nearly
identical,84 the Ninth Circuit rejected the Torres approach, foreclosing
corporate defendant Dole Food's access to a federal forum.85 The
Patrickson court, in declining to follow Torres, provides a scathing,
though seldom convincing, critique of the Torres approach.86 This
Section reconstructs the Ninth Circuit's scatter-shot objections to the
Torres approach. The court provides three arguments; namely, the
79. Further, there does not appear to be a doctrinal rationale that could be supplied on
the court's behalf. See Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795, 803 (9th Cir. 2001) (con
sidering foreign government's interests irrelevant to federal jurisdictional issue).
80.

Pacheco de Perez,

139 F.3d at 1378.

81. See id. at 1377; Marathon Oil, 115 F.3d at 320 (refusing to grant federal question ju
risdiction because injuries took place, at least partially, on American soil); cf. In re World
War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig., 1 14 F. Supp. 2d 939, 942-944 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(citing Torres as authority for extending federal common law of foreign relations to issues
involving American plaintiffs suing Japanese corporations under state tort law for events
that occurred abroad).
82. See Pacheco
F.3d at 541-43.

de Perez,

139 F.3d at 1377;

Marathon Oil,

115 F.3d at 320;

Torres,

113

83. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Mass Tort Litigation the Dilemma of Federalization, 44
DEPAUL L. REV. 755, 767-71 (1995) (providing a federalism argument for limiting the role
of federal courts in adjudicating common law tort cases); Roger Trangsrud, Federalism and
Mass Tort Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2263, 2265-67 (2000) (arguing that tort adjudication
has traditionally been left to the state courts as a matter of federalism).
84. The notable exception is the lack of government protest in
Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 2001).
85.

Id.

86.

Id.

at 799-805.

Patrickson. See
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approach represents an illegitimate exception to the well
pleaded complaint rule, the approach misconstrues the federal com
mon law of foreign relations, and foreign governmental protest has no
logical relationship to federal question jurisdiction.87 This Section ad
dresses these arguments in turn.
Torres

1.

The

Torres Approach Represents an Illegitimate Exception to the
Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule

Although the Fifth Circuit fashioned the Torres approach as "a
very specific application of the well-pleaded complaint rule,"88 the
Ninth Circuit reads the Torres approach as an exception to the well
pleaded complaint rule.89 This disagreement forms the crux of the
Patrickson court's argument against the Torres approach.
The Patrickson court argues that the plaintiffs' assertion of "fed
eral right or immunity," not Dole Food's defenses, establishes federal
question jurisdiction in accordance with the well-pleaded complaint
rule.90 In so arguing, the court makes implicit reference to the Holmes
test.91 Following the Holmes test, a plaintiff's cause of action must be
created by federal law to give rise to federal question jurisdiction.92
The court concludes that because the plaintiffs' complaint turns en
tirely upon state law, any federal issues arising in the case, such as fed
eral common law of foreign relations, could only be raised as a de
fense.93 Thus, the court concludes that the Torres approach must
represent an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule.94
Although the Patrickson court stops here, the argument is incom
plete. The court tacitly relies upon the proposition that courts cannot
fashion exceptions to the well-pleaded complaint rule. It is possible to
formulate a doctrinal argument on the Patrickson court's behalf.
There is only one exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule: fed
eral officers may establish federal question jurisdiction via a federal
defense.95 Importantly, Congress created this exception, not the

87.

Id.

88. Marathon Oil Co.
Section l.A.1.
89.

Patrickson,

90.

Id.

91.

See Sllpra

v.

Rurhgas, A.G., 1 1 5 F.3d 315, 320 (5th Cir. 1 997);

see sL1pra

251 F.3d at 801 .

at 799; see Sllpra note 31 and accompanying text.
note 40 and accompanying text.

92. Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916).
93.

Patrickson,

94.

Id.

251 F.3d at 800.

at 801 .

95. Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 1 36-37 (1989). Aquafaith Shipping, Ltd. v. Jarillas,
963 F.2d 806, 808 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that the only exception to the well-pleaded com
plaint rule is that federal officers can establish jurisdiction with a federal defense).
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courts.96 It follows, then, that only Congress, or perhaps the Supreme
Court,97 can create exceptions to the well-pleaded complaint rule.98 As
such, the Torres approach represents an illegitimate (i.e. , lower court
created) exception to the rule.99
2.

Torres Misconstrues the Federal Common L a w of Foreign
Relations

Although finding Dole Food's reliance upon the Torres approach
in violation of the well-pleaded complaint rule is sufficient for denying
federal question jurisdiction, the Patrickson court goes on, presumably
in dicta, to provide a critique of the Torres approach's view of federal
common law of foreign relations.100 As argued above,101 the Torres
court relied implicitly upon Sabbatino, and explicitly upon Marcos, for
its view of federal common law of foreign relations.102 The Patrickson
court criticizes the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits' reading of this line of
cases.103 In an effort to present the Patrickson court's convoluted cri
tique in the best light, it is presented as two distinct arguments although the court itself presents the critique as one argument.104
The first argument concerns the scope of federal common law of
foreign relations. The Torres court views federal common law of for
eign relations expansively, including any issue that substantially affects
American foreign affairs.105 The Patrickson court takes issue with this
expansive reading.106 The Patrickson court argues that Sabbatino is a

96.

Aquafaith,

963 F.2d at 808 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)).

97. The Court originally fashioned the rule in Louisville & Nashville Rail Co.
211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908), and presumably could make exceptions to it.

v. Mottley,

98. See Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 804 ("If federal courts are so much better suited than
state courts for handling cases that might raise foreign policy concerns, Congress will surely
pass a statute giving us that jurisdiction.").
99. See id. at 804-05. The Patrickson court also notes that Congress has not acted to
grant jurisdiction beyond § 1331 to cases that raise the federal common law of foreign rela
tions as a defense. Id. at 803. The court runs through a list of statutory grants of jurisdiction
relating to foreign affairs. Id. The court notices that "[w]hat Congress has not done is to ex
tend federal-question j urisdiction to all suits where the federal common law of foreign rela
tions might arise as an issue." Id. Thus, the court concludes that, excepting the possible ap
plicability of § 1331, there are no grounds for federal question jurisdiction. Id.
100.

Id.

101.

See supra Section

at 801-03.
l.A.2.

102. Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1997).
103.

Patrickson,

1 04.

Id.

251 F.3d at 801-03.

105. Torres, 1 13 F.3d at 543 n.8; see also Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344,
352 (2d Cir. 1986); Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 52, at 1632-36; Weisburd, supra
note 69, at 15-19.
106.

Patrickson,

251 F.3d at 801-03.
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choice of law case within the Erie doctrine, not a case granting
sweeping federal common law making power to the lower ' federal
courts as the expansive view suggests.107 The court notes that
Sabbatino reached the Supreme Court by way of diversity jurisdiction,
and the Supreme Court specifically rejected addressing federal ques
tion j urisdictional issues.108 From this reading, the Patrickson court
limits the holding of Sabbatino to determining " [w]hether a foreign
state's act is given legal force in the courts of the United States."109 As
such, the federal common law of foreign relations is applicable only
when the validity of an act of a foreign state is in question.110
Turning next to the Marcos case, the court suggests an alternative
holding to the one relied upon in Torres.111 Following its reading of
Sabbatino, the court argues that federal question jurisdiction extended
to the Marcos case only because the validity of an act of a foreign state
was raised in the complaint, not because the complaint raised a sub
stantial issue of American foreign policy.112 Sticking with this interpre
tation of Sabbatino and Marcos, Dole Food has no grounds for federal
question jurisdiction, because the plaintiffs' complaint does not turn
on the validity of an act of a foreign state.113
The Ninth Circuit's second argument concerns exclusive federal ju
risdiction. The court reads the Torres approach as granting federal
courts exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving the federal com
mon law of foreign relations.114 Yet, it is Congress' prerogative to
grant the federal courts such exclusive jurisdiction.115 Moreover, as
107. Id. at 799-800, 802; see also Garvey, supra note 69, 474-82 (arguing that Sabbatino
properly instructs federal courts to refrain from engaging in foreign policy issues); Weisburd,
supra note 69, at 20-27 (arguing that the "foreign means federal" approach is too broad);
Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 52, at 1690-98 (outlining the detrimental impact of
this expansive reading of Sabbatino ).
108. Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 800, 802 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398 (1964)).
109.

Patrickson,

1 10.

Id.

at 799-800.

251 F.3d at 799.

1 1 1.

Id.

at 801; see supra note 67 and accompanying text.

1 12. Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 801 (noting that the Philippine's claim rested upon the va
lidity of a Filipino executive order, i.e., an act of state).
1 13. Id. at 800. However, the court realizes, along with most other courts and scholars,
that "Marcos clearly said more, broadly suggesting that federal-question jurisdiction could
'probably' be premised on the fact that a case may affect our nation's foreign relations." Id.
at 802. The court argues that this reading of Marcos is incompatible with its "act of state"
reading of Sabbatino. Id. As such, i• rejects this reading. Id.
1 14. See id. at 802 ("But Sabbatino does not say that federal courts alone are competent
to develop this body of law."); id. at 803 ("We see no reason to treat the federal common law
of foreign relations any differently than other areas of federal law [and would allow state
courts to apply it].").
1 15. See id. at 804-05; see also Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 459 (1990) (stating that ex
clusive federal jurisdiction over federal question cases has been the exception rather than
the rule); Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1 98 1 ) (holding that there
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"Sabbatino [is] about choice of law, not jurisdiction," that case does
not provide a basis for finding exclusive federal jurisdiction in federal
common law of foreign relations cases.116 As such, the court rejects the
Torres approach insofar as it imposes exclusive federal court jurisdic
tion.117

3.

Protests by a Foreign Government Have No Logical Connection to
Federal Jurisdiction

A necessary condition for triggering the Torres approach is that
the foreign government involved in the litigation - but not a party to
it - file a brief opposing the litigation.118 The Patrickson court criti
cizes this proposition both as a matter of doctrine and as a matter of
institutional competency.119
The court levels the doctrinal attack first.120 The Patrickson court
characterizes the governmental protest element of the Torres ap
proach as standing "for the proposition that federal courts may assert
j urisdiction over a case simply because a foreign government has ex
pressed a special interest in its outcome."121 The court argues that
there is no logical connection between a foreign government's opposi
tion to litigation, in which it is not a party, and federal question juris
diction, as there is no doctrinal hook upon which to hang this trigger
ing element of the Torres approach.122
Further, in the court's view, as a matter of institutional compe
tence, the executive branch provides the appropriate venue for foreign
governments to express their displeasure with litigation in the United
States's courts.123 The judiciary is uniquely the most incompetent
branch of government to make foreign policy judgments as called for
in the Torres approach.124 This is the case, as "the federal courts have
little context or expertise by which to analyze and address the poten-

is a presumption of concurrent state and federal jurisdiction over all federal law that can
only be overcome by explicit congressional command, unmistakable legislative history, or a
clear incompatibility between state court jurisdiction and federal interests).
1 1 6.

Patrickson,

1 17.

Id.

251 F.3d at 802.

1 1 8.

See supra

1 19.

Patrickson,

120.

Id.

at 803.

121.

Id.

This reading is overly strong, see infra Section 11.A.3.

122.

Patrickson,

at 802.
Section I.A.3.
251 F.3d at 803-04.

251 F.3d at 803.

123. Id. ; see also In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litig., 100 F. Supp. 2d
31, 38 (D.D.C. 2000).
124.

Patrickson,

251 F.3d at 804.
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tial implications of a lawsuit on foreign relations. "125 Therefore, in the
Ninth Circuit's view, " [c]ourts should not put themselves in the posi
tion of having to make such judgments. " 126 Having advanced these
three scathing critiques, the court rejected the Torres approach.
II.

SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS: A CRITIQUE OF THE ATTRACTION
TOWARD BROAD AND NARROW JURISDICTIONAL EXTREMES

Part II argues that neither the Torres approach nor the Patrickson
challenge are persuasive. Section II.A argues that the Patrickson court
fundamentally misinterprets the Torres approach. Section 11.B ad
vances both pragmatic and doctrinal critiques of the Torres approach.
A.

The

Patrickson Straw Man

The Patrickson court provides three critiques of Torres; namely,
the approach represents an illegitimate exception to the well-pleaded
complaint rule, the approach misconstrues the federal common law of
foreign relations, and foreign governmental protest has no logical rela
tionship to federal question jurisdiction.127 Section II.A addresses
these in turn, arguing that the court misinterprets the Torres approach,
resulting in an unconvincing, straw man critique.
1.

Patrickson Ignores the Necessary

Construction Test as It Relates to

the Well-Pleaded Complaint R ule

The Patrickson court argues that the Torres approach represents
an illegitimate exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule, even
though proponents of the approach present it as a specific application
of the rule.128 This forms the heart of the Patrickson challenge.129 In so
arguing, the Ninth Circuit sought to establish federal question jurisdic
tion via the Holmes test130 - one of two independent tests for deter
mining federal question jurisdiction.131 The Patrickson court furnishes
a fine analysis of the Holmes test, holding that the case does not pres
ent a federal question because the complaint does not rely upon a fed125. Id. (quoting In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litig., 100 F. Supp. 2d
31, 38 (D.D.C. 2000)).
1 26.

Id.

127.

See supra

at 804 n.8.
Section LB.

128. Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 801; Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, A.G., 115 F.3d 315, 320
(5th Cir. 1 997) (characterizing the Torres approach as a "very specific application of the
well-pleaded complaint rule"); see supra Section I.B.1.
129.

See supra

Section I.B.l.

130.

See supra

note 91 and accompanying text.

131.

See supra notes

40-41 and accompanying text.
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erally created cause of action.132 The Holmes test, however, is a rule of
inclusion, not exclusion, with regard to federal question jurisdiction.133
Proponents of the Torres approach rely upon the necessary construc
tion· test for federal question jurisdiction, not the Holmes test.134 In
fact, proponents of the Torres approach concede that federal question
jurisdiction cannot be grounded via the Holmes test.135 As such, the
Holmes test analysis provided in Patrickson is irrelevant as failure to
pass it does not equate to a failure to obtain federal question jurisdic
tion.
To attack the Torres approach on well-pleaded complaint grounds
directly, an opponent of the view must confront the Torres approach's
use of the necessary construction test. Yet, the Patrickson court does
not seriously address this test. The court makes only a passing refer
ence to the test in a footnote, asserting that the Torres approach's reli
ance on the necessary construction test is "curious."136 Citing Franchise
Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust,137 the Patrickson
court argues that a state cause of action can pass the necessary con
struction test "when Congress has established a federal cause of action
pre-empting state law."138 The court then notes that Congress has not
passed a statute pre-empting state law for issues that implicate the
federal common law of foreign relations.139 As such, Patrickson con
cludes that the Torres approach's use of the necessary construction
test is illegitimate.140
The court's argument at this juncture is vague, but under any in
terpretation it is unconvincing. First, the Patrickson court appears to
conflate the necessary construction jurisdictional test with federal pre
emption doctrine.141 The necessary construction test is not identical to
the question of statutory pre-emption.142 For example, in Merrell Dow

132. See Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916)
(Holmes, J.) (establishing the Holmes test); see also supra note 40 and accompanying text.
133. Franchise Tax Bd.

v.

Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9 (1983).

134. See supra note 42 and accompanying text; see also Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc
Thompson, 487 U.S. 804, 808-09 (1986) (discussing necessary construction test).
135.

See Torres v.

v.

S. Peru Copper Corp., 1 13 F.3d 540, 542 (5th Cir. 1997).

136. Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795, 802 n.5 (9th Cir. 2001).
137. 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
138.

Patrickson,

139.

Id.

140.

Id.

141.

See id.

251 F.3d at 802 n.5.

142. See Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199 (1921) (establishing
the necessary construction test and holding that cases must present issues that are more than
merely colorable as federal and reasonably rely upon federal law to ground federal question
jurisdiction); see also Christianson v. Colt. Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808 (1988)
(holding that plaintiff's right to relief must necessarily depend upon the "resolution of a sub-
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the Supreme Court found, by
stipulation, that Congress did not intend to create a federal cause of
action or pre-empt state tort law under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act ("FDCA").144 Nevertheless, the Court required additional analysis
to determine whether a state tort cause of action that relied upon the
FDCA to establish a presumption of negligence established federal
question jurisdiction via the necessary construction test.145 If the pre
emption analysis and the necessary construction test were one in the
same, the Court would not have required this extra analysis. The
Court simply could have found jurisdiction lacking by stipulation.146
Second, even assuming �he Patrickson court is not applying a pre
emption analysis, its argument concerning the necessary construction
test is unconvincing. The court could be arguing for two different posi
tions.147 The first possible reading of the court's argument is that
pleading congressional action pre-empting state law is one way, but
not the only way, of passing the necessary construction test.148 If this is
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson,143

stantial question of federal law" (internal citation omitted)); cf Crosby v. Nat'! Foreign
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-73 (2000) (providing a primer on pre-emption doctrine):
A fundamental principle of the Constitution is that Congress has the power to pre-empt
state law. Even without an express provision for pre-emption, we have found that state law
must yield to a congressional Act in at least two circumstances. When Congress intends fed
eral law to occupy the field, state law in that area is pre-empted. And even if Congress has
not occupied the field, state law is naturally pre-empted to the extent of any conflict with a
federal statute. We will find pre-emption where it is impossible for a private party to comply
with both state and federal law, and where under the circumstances of a particular case, the
challenged state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress. What is a sufficient obstacle is a matter of judgment, to
be informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and in
tended effects . . . .
Id.

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
143. 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
144.

Id.

145.

See id.

at 810-11 .
a t 811-17.

146. Federal common law of foreign relations seldom, if ever, entirely pre-empts state
causes of action. Rather, it supplies the governing standard for certain foreign affairs issues
that arise within the context of state causes of action. For example, in Sabbatino only the
issue of the validity of Cuba's expropriation decree was governed by federal common law of
foreign relations. The other elements of the underlying conversion tort remain governed by
state law. Banco de Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 439 (1964). Similarly, only
the issue of the validity of the Filipino executive-order in Marcos is governed by federal
common law of foreign relations. Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 352-62
(2d Cir. 1986). The Torres court does not make clear what particular issue is governed by
federal common law of foreign relations, perhaps because it immediately proceeds to affirm
the forum non conveniens dismissal. Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540 (5th Cir.
1997). Perhaps Torres' lack of clarity led the Patrickson court to perceive it as entirely pre
empting state tort causes of action.
147.

See

Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795, 802 n.5 (9th Cir. 2001).

148. See id. Of course, if Congress has created a cause of action by pre-emption, then
the case properly arises under the Holmes test. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S.
386, 393 (1987).
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the best reading of Patrickson on this point, the argument is again ir
relevant - or at best incomplete. Proving that the Torres approach
does not conform to one method of passing the necessary construction
test does not prove that the approach fails to conform to other meth
ods of passing the necessary construction test. The second possible
reading here is that pleading congressional action pre-empting state
law is the sole method of passing the necessary construction test.149
This reading simply misstates necessary construction test doctrine as
pre-emption doctrine, but, as argued above, the necessary construction
test and preemption doctrine are not one in the same analyses.150 As
such, the Patrickson court's well-pleaded complaint rule argument
fails to undercut the Torres approach's position.
2.

Patrickson's View of Federal Common

Law of Foreign Relations

is Too Restrictive

The Torres approach to the federal common law of foreign rela
tions encompasses claims affecting the vital economic and sovereign
interests of a foreign state even when the foreign state is not a party.151
The Patrickson court argues that Torres' treatment of federal common
law of foreign relations is too expansive.152 The court presents two dis
tinct arguments here.153 First, the court argues that case law only sup
ports viewing federal common law of foreign relations as applicable
when the validity of an act of a foreign state is in question.154 Second,
the Patrickson court argues that the Torres approach's vesting of ex
clusive jurisdiction in the federal courts is beyond the power of a lower
federal court.155 In formulating its critique, Patrickson misinterprets
the Torres approach and the surrounding doctrine, thereby offering
criticisms of a straw man version of Torres.
Beginning with the Patrickson court's second argument, the court
properly admonishes those who would claim exclusive jurisdiction for
the federal courts over federal common law of foreign relations is
sues.156 As the Ninth Circuit notes, all species of federal common law

149.

See Patrickson,

251 F.3d at 802 n.5.

150. See Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 810-17 (1986) (requiring
analysis in addition to a stipulation that Congress had not pre-empted state tort law to de
termine if a state tort cause of action relying upon federal law to prove a presumption of
negligence created federal question jurisdiction under the necessary construction test).
151. Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540, 542 (5th Cir. 1997).
152.

Patrickson,

251 F.3d at 799-803.

153.

Id. ; see also supra

154.

Patrickson,

251 F.3d at 799-800; see also supra note 107 and accompanying text.

155.

Patrickson,

251 F.3d at 802-03; see also supra note 116 and accompanying text.

156.

Patrickson,

251 F.3d at 802-03.

Section I.B.2.
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may be applied by state courts via the Supremacy Clause.157 Nonethe
less, the court misses the mark here, because proponents of the Torres
approach never assert exclusive jurisdiction over federal common law
of foreign relations issues.158 Even courts and commentators critical of
the Torres approach do not construe it as claiming exclusive federal
jurisdiction.159 The Patrickson court simply misreads Torres, making
the court's objections irrelevant on this score.160
The Patrickson court's first argument advances the view that case
law only supports viewing federal common law of foreign relations as
applicable when the validity of an act of a foreign state is in question.
The court goes astray here by committing two errors in formulating
this ultra-restrictive view: (1) it presents an overly narrow interpreta
tion of Sabbatino and (2) it fails to address Zschernig v. Miller.161
As was discussed above, 162 the Patrickson court narrowly interprets
Sabbatino as a choice of law decision within the Erie doctrine.163 The
court reads Sabbatino as establishing an exception to the usual pre
sumption in favor of state law in diversity cases when the validity of an
act of a foreign state is in question.164 According to the Patrickson
court, Sabbatino does not justify general federal common law making
powers in the foreign affairs arena.165 Such a reading of Sabbatino
places the Patrickson court out of the mainstream on this issue. Nearly
all courts and scholars read Sabbatino as authorizing the creation of
federal common law of foreign relations with a scope broader than the
Patrickson court provides.166 Although a small contingent of scholars
157.

Id.

158. See Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368 (11 th Cir. 1998) (not claiming
exclusive jurisdiction); Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, A.G., 115 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 1 997)
(same); Torres v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 1 13 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 1997) (same); see also
supra Section I.A.
159. See, e.g. , In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litig., 100 F. Supp. 2d 31,
34-38 (D.D.C. 2000) (failing to attribute exclusive federal jurisdiction to the Torres ap
proach); Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 52, at 1695-98 (same).
160. See Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 802-03. Perhaps defendant Dole Food argued that the
federal courts should have exclusive jurisdiction over such claims, thus explaining this ap
parent mistake by the court.
161. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
162.

See supra

163.

Patrickson,

164.

Id.

165.

Id.

166.

note 107 and accompanying text.
251 F.3d at 799-800.

See, e.g., Atherton v. F.D.I.C.,
Texas Indus. statement affirming federal

519 U.S. 213, 226 (1997) (quoting with approval
courts' power to make common law in the foreign
affairs arena); Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 518 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissent
ing) (quoting with approval the Texas Indus. statement affirming federal courts' power to
make common law in the foreign affairs arena); Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.,
451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) ("[F]ederal common law exists . . . [in] disputes implicating . . . our
relations with foreign nations"); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968) (holding an
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supports a restrictive approach toward the federal common law of for
eign relations, i67 even these scholars do not support the ultra
restrictive vision of federal common law of foreign relations that the
Patrickson court offers.168
The Ninth Circuit's unique interpret�tion of federal common law
of foreign relations might be tenable if it could account for all binding
precedent on the issue.169 The Patrickson court stumbles on this
point.no First, the Supreme Court has on several occasions quoted with
approval the following statement from Texas Industries, Inc. v.
Radcliff Materials, lnc. 1 7 1: " [F]ederal common law exists . . . [in] disOregon probate law void, even in the absence of federal legislative or executive action, be
cause it may adversely affect the power of the federal government to conduct foreign af
fairs); Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 352-53 (2d Cir. 1986), cert denied, 481
U.S. 1048 (1987) (noting federal courts' power to create common law in foreign relations
arena); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 6.2.4, at 349 (2d ed. 1994) (noting
federal courts' power to create common law of foreign relations to ensure uniformity of de
cisions within foreign affairs arena); LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFA IRS AND THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 139 (2d ed. 1996) ("[F]oreign affairs [is] a domain in which federal
courts can make law with supremacy."); MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION:
TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 125 (2d ed. 1990) (stating that
Sabbatino recognized the federal courts' power to make common law in the foreign affairs
arena); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-5, at 656-57 (3d ed.
2000) (noting that state infringement into the realm of foreign affairs is unconstitutional);
Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State A uthority, and the Preemptive Power of International Law,
1994 SU P. CT. REV. 295, 332 n.109 ("Even commentators relatively unsympathetic to the
development of federal common law recognize that foreign relations is a special case.");
Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REY.
1245, 1292-98 (1996) (noting overwhelming judicial and scholastic support for power to cre
ate federal common law of foreign relations); Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the
Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. REV. 263, 288 n.84 (1992) (noting general support for power to
create federal common law of foreign relations).
167. See Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 52, at 1632 n.62 (stating that, in addition
to himself, only Peter J. Shiro and Arthur M. Weisburd would radically limit the scope of the
federal common law of foreign relations). The author of this Note would add Jack I. Garvey
to Professor Goldsmith's list. Garvey, supra note 69, at 474-76 (although not directly ad
dressing federal common law of foreign relations, Garvey argues that Sabbatino, properly
understood, prohibits federal courts from getting involved in foreign affairs issues).
168. E.g. , Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 52, at 1710-11 (conceding that a 'motive
review' of state court decisions within the foreign affairs arena under federal common law of
foreign relations could be justified); Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigration in an Era of
Demi-Sovereignties, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 121, 161-74 (1994) (arguing that the externalities logic
for uniform federal laws in international issues is obsolete insofar as foreign states can eco
nomically retaliate against individual states, but noting there is presently a slim basis for rec
ognizing that targeted retaliation is a trend); Weisburd, supra note 69, at 59 (arguing that
federal common law of foreign relations should be restricted to three distinct areas).
1 69. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1170 (9th Cir. 2001) (Kozinski, J.) ("Binding
authority within this [hierarchical] regime [of the federal court system] cannot be considered
and cast aside; it is not merely evidence of what the law is. Rather, caselaw on point is the
law. If a court must decide an issue governed by a prior opinion that constitutes binding
authority, the later court is bound to reach the same result, even if it considers the rule un
wise or incorrect.").
170.

See Patrickson v.

Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795, 799-802 (9th Cir. 2001).

171. 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
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putes implicating . . . our relations with foreign nations."172 This state
ment is broader than the Patrickson court's ultra-restrictive foreign act
of state approach.173 Despite the Supreme Court's reiterations of the
Texas Industries statement,174 the Patrickson court does not, presuma
bly, consider it binding because it was originally made in dictum.175
The Patrickson court cannot provide a similar argument for its
failure to even mention Zschernig.1 76 In fact, Professor Goldsmith's
Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, which the Patrickson
court approvingly cites,177 refers to the Zschernig1 78 decision on nu
merous occasions as a foundational case for the conventional view of
federal common law of foreign relations.179 Additionally, In re
Tobacco I Governmental Health Care Costs Litigation,180 also approv
ingly cited by the court, treats Zschernig as a foundational case for
federal common law of foreign relations.181 In Zschernig, the Supreme
Court held an Oregon probate statute invalid, which required the state
courts to, in effect, normatively evaluate the political systems of for
eign nations, because it impermissibly engaged the state in foreign re
lations.182 This holding indubitably broadens the scope of federal
common law of foreign relations beyond the Patrickson court's ultra-

172.

Id.

173.

See Patrickson,

at 641; see also supra note 166.

1 74.

See supra

251 F.3d at 799-802.

note 166.

175. See Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 801 n.4; see also Goldsmith, Federal
52, at 1704 n.358 (characterizing the Texas Indus. statement as dictum).
176.

See Patrickson,

177.

Id.

Courts, supra

note

251 F.3d at 799-805.

at 804.

178. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (holding an Oregon statute that required
probate courts to evaluate the normative value of foreign political systems, under the guise
of reciprocity, before transferring property to foreign next of kin invalid as an intrusion upon
the federal government's exclusive right to conduct foreign affairs even though the president
and Congress had failed to act).
179. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 52, at 162 1 , 1629-1639, 1 699-1700, 1704, 1711.
180. 100 F. Supp. 2d 31, 35 (D.D.C. 2000). In the court's defense, the Supreme Court did
not style the Zschernig decision as an application of the federal common law of foreign rela
tions. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 430-4 1 . However, Zschernig is considered an application of fed
eral common law of foreign relations principles by legal scholars and courts. See, e.g. , In re
Tobacco, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 35; Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 52, at 1621 (Zschernig
is an application of the federal common law of foreign relations doctrine); Harold G. Maier,
The Bases and Range of Federal Common Law in Private International Matters, 5 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 133, 136-1 59 (1971) (discussing Zschernig and its aftermath as a seminal case
in federal common law of foreign relations jurisprudence); Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations
Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1241 -43 (1999) (discussing importance of Zschernig
in judicially establishing federal dominance over the states in foreign affairs); Weisburd,
supra note 69, at 6-8 (characterizing Zschernig as one of the essential cases establishing fed
eral common law of foreign relations).
181.

Patrickson,

182.

Zschernig,

251 F.3d at 803, 803 n.7, 804 (citing In re

389 U.S. at 441.

Tobacco).
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restrictive view.183 Although lower courts have given Zschernig a nar
rower reading in recent years,184 the Supreme Court has not overruled
it.185 As such, the Ninth Circuit continues to be bound by Zschernig,
rendering the court's ultra-restrictive view of federal common law of
foreign relations untenable.
3.

Patrickson Misinterprets the Torres Triggering Criteria

The Torres approach incorporates two triggering
Patrickson court challenges one of them; namely, the

criteria.186 The
triggering ele
ment requiring foreign governments to protest the litigation before a
grant of federal question jurisdiction will be considered.187 The Ninth
Circuit leveled two attacks on this score: a doctrinal concern, arguing
that subject matter jurisdiction has no logical connection to foreign
governmental protest,188 and an institutional competence concern, ar
guing that the courts are uniquely unqualified to determine when is
sues substantially affect foreign relations.189 The court finds these criti
cisms fatal for the Torres approach.190 Although the substance of these
challenges are persuasive, the Patrickson court fails to properly under
stand the triggering criterion itself and the role it plays in the Torres
approach, leading the court to overstate its conclusion.
The Ninth Circuit declines to follow the Torres approach "insofar
as (it] stand[s] for the proposition that the federal courts may assert
jurisdiction over a case simply because a foreign government has ex
pressed a special interest in its outcome."191 The court construes the
foreign government's protest of the litigation as a sufficient condition
for applying the Torres approach.192 As was previously argued, the for
eign government's protest of the litigation is a necessary - not suffi-

183.

See id. Contra Patrickson,

251 F.3d at 799-802.

184. See, e.g., Trojan Techs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 913-14 (3rd Cir. 1990)
(upholding state "buy American" statute against a Zschernig based attack because the stat
ute did not allow state officials to comment upon, nor discriminate among, foreign nations);
Bd. of Trustee's of the Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720,
746 (Md. 1989) (distinguishing Zschernig as proscribing only extensive state judicial scrutiny
and criticism of foreign nations).
185. See Crosby v. Nat'! Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 374 n.8 (2000) (declining
to address the Zschernig issue).
186.

See supra

Section l.A.3-4.

187.

See supra

Section l.B.3.

188. Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., Inc., 251 F.3d 795, 803 (9th Cir. 2001 ); see also supra
Section I.B.3.
1 89.

Patrickson,

251 F.3d at 803-04. This argument will be addressed infra Section Il.B.2.

190.

Patrickson,

at 804-05.

191.

Id.

192.

See id.

at 803.
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cient - condition for the application of the Torres approach.193 Even
proponents of the Torres approach would not apply it simply because
a foreign government expressed a special interest in the litigation.194
Putting this misunderstanding aside, the Patrickson court does go
on to argue convincingly that a foreign government's protest of a case
has no logical connection to the granting of federal question jurisdic
tion - even as a necessary condition.195 This is not a damning blow to
the Torres approach. Foreign government protest of litigation is but a
triggering criterion for the Torres approach.196 It is conceptually dis
tinct from the Torres approach proper because it performs a limiting
function - not an expansive function as the other elements of the ap
proach do. As such, the Torres approach is conceptually feasible with
out the foreign government's protest of the litigation as a triggering
criterion - it is simply more expansive. Ironically, the Patrickson
court's critique merely severs the untenable foreign government's pro
test of the litigation triggering criterion from the Torres approach
proper, leaving the approach more expansive than even its proponents
advocate.
B.

The Torres Reproach

This Section advances pragmatic and doctrinal criticisms of the
approach. First, this Section argues that the Torres approach
threatens to swamp the federal courts by funneling an overwhelming
amount of litigation into the federal system. Second, this Section con
tends that constitutional doctrine requires that the bulk of civil litiga
tion remain in the state courts. Finally, this Section argues that the
Torres approach's attempt to avoid these problems by limiting federal
question jurisdiction to cases implicating only important foreign policy
concerns presents an unworkable regime.
Torres

193. Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1378 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding
Venezuela's lack of protest indicative that no significant foreign relations issues are at
stake); Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, A.G., 115 F.3d 315, 320 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding
Germany's protest of the suit insufficient grounds for jurisdiction); Torres v. S. Peru Copper
Corp. 1 13 F.3d 540, 542-43 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding Peru's protest alone insufficient grounds
for jurisdiction); see also supra Section l.A.3.
194. Compare Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 803 (stating that the Torres approach grants fed
eral question jurisdiction when a foreign government expresses a special interest in a case),
with Marathon Oil, 115 F.3d at 320 (denying federal question jurisdiction despite Germany's
express special interest in the case).
195.

See Patrickson,

196.

See supra

251 F.3d at 803.

note 72 and accompanying text.
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Pragmatic and Doctrinal Concerns

Strong pragmatic concerns counsel against adopting the Torres ap
proach. In 1994, approximately 85 million cases were filed in the
United States.197 Of these, 19 million cases were filed as civil actions.198
Of these 19 million civil actions, approximately 236,000 were filed in
federal court, slightly more than one percent.199 The remaining 18.77
million cases were filed in state courts.200 As is evident, the American
civil justice system is set up to steer the vast bulk of litigation into the
state courts.201 Although traditionally civil actions involved mostly
domestic litigants and issues, the globalization phenomenon increas
ingly injects international litigants and international issues into these
disputes.202 For example, " [o]ne in six domestic private-sector jobs in
the United States is now linked to the global economy."203 It is little
wonder, then, that traditional state causes of action, such as tort and
contract, often implicate foreign affairs.204 In an increasingly globalized
world, taking the Torres approach for all it is worth would have the ef
fect of allowing any case with international aspects an opportunity for
removal from the state courts to the federal courts.205 Yet, the federal
courts are already overcrowded.206 Potentially allowing every multina197. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 310 (5th ed. 2000) (citing BRIAN J.
OSTROM E T A L . , EXAMINING T H E WORK OF STATE COURTS, 1995: A NATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT (1996)).
198.

Id.

199. Annual Report, Administrative Office of the United States Courts 1998, Tables C2, C-2A, D-1, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/dirrpt98/index.html (last visited Jan. 19,
2002). This percentage is a rough figure using rounded total filing figures, but the basic point
- that federal question jurisdiction represents a very small fraction of over all civil filings is accurate.
200.

Id.

201.

See id.

202. See e.g. , Garvey, supra note 69, at 462 (noting the effect that globalization has had
upon civil litigation); Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 52, at 1634-35, 1671-77 (arguing
that the increasing percentage of civil suits that involve foreign parties or transactions makes
the traditional distinction between domestic and international litigation almost impossible to
make); Charlotte Ku & Christopher J. Borgen, A merican Lawyers and International Com
petence, 18 D I CK . J. INT'L L. 493, 494-501 (2000) (arguing that globalization on numerous
fronts - economic, political, environmental, public health, travel - has transformed the
American practice of law, forcing American lawyers to address international issues on a
regular basis).
203. Spiro, supra note 180, at 1248.
204.

See

Goldsmith,

Federal Courts, supra

note 52, at 1672-73.

205. See Weisburd, supra note 69, at 20 ("To argue that federal common law must gov
ern whenever a case implicates the international relations of the United States is to provide
a basis for taking all cases with international elements out of the state courts.").
206. See e.g. , United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 161 (1984) (referring to "the
crowded dockets of the courts"); WILLIAM P. MCLAUCHLAN, FEDERAL COURT
CASELOADS 73-166 (1984); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND
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tional corporate defendant involved in transnational litigation access
to the federal removal docket would overwhelm the system, even if
the federal courts remanded most of these cases.207 From a purely
practical perspective, the Torres approach must be rejected, leaving
state courts to hear the bulk of international cases. The federal judici
ary simply does not have the capacity to take them.
Constitutional doctrine counsels against the adoption of the Torres
approach as well. The federal courts, unlike the state courts, are courts
of limited jurisdiction, requiring constitutional and congressional
authority to hear cases.208 As a consequence, since the founding of the
Republic the state courts have provided the primary fora for litiga
tion. 209 As Alexander Hamilton argued in Federalist 82, "the States will
retain all pre-existing authorities which may not be exclusively dele
gated to the federal head . . . [and] as a rule . . . the State courts will
retain the jurisdiction they now have."210 Additionally, constitutional
REFORM 59-93 (1983); MATTH EW SILBERMAN, THE CIVIL JUSTICE PROCESS 156 (1985);
Thomas E. Baker & Denis J. Hauptly, Taking A nother Measure of the "Crisis of Volume " in
the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 51 WASH . & LEE L. REV. 97 (1994); Thomas E. Baker, Imagin
ing the Alternative Futures of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 28 GA. L. REV. 913, 915, 918
(1 994); Developments in the Law - The Paths of Civil Litigation, 1 13 HARV. L. REV. 1753,
1 806, 1826 (2000). Overcrowding continues to worsen in the federal courts. See, e.g. , Sec'y of
Labor v. DeSisto, 929 F.2d 789, 795 n.5 ( 1 st Cir. 1991) (noting that "there is a sense that the
congestion [of court dockets] is worsening"). From 1995-1999, the average number of cases
disposed of by district court judges rose from 383 to 403, an increase of five percent. See
STATISTICS DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF TH E UNITED STATES COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF
TH E UNITED STATES COURTS: 1 999 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DI RECTOR 25 (2000) (here
inafter JUDICIAL BUSINESS], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus1 999/contents.html

(last visited Jan. 19, 2002).
207. The federal courts heard 31 ,543 civil cases on removal from state courts in 1998.

See

JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 206, at 53, tbl. S-7. Removal cases, then, already account for

approximately 13% of total civil cases in federal court. On average, federal district courts
take nine months to issue dismissals in civil cases before the pre-trial stage. See id. at 1 66, tbl.
C-5. Adding more cases to this already precarious mix could lead to a collapse of the federal
court system. See Thomas R. Hrdlick, Appellate Review of Remand Orders in Removed
Cases: Are They Losing a Certain Appeal?, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 535, 540-41 (1999) (describing
the swamping of the federal courts after the Civil War when Congress expanded the removal
docket out of a distrust of Southern courts, which led to congressional tightening of removal
jurisdiction twelve years later).
208. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (stating that
the federal courts' jurisdiction is controlled by Congress). The exception to this requirement
of congressional delegation of authority is the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction under
Article l ll. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803); see also supra note 39.
209. The first Congress, staffed by several constitutional convention delegates, provided
for limited federal court jurisdiction, beginning a tradition of preference for litigation in state
courts. See, e.g., The Judiciary Act of 1 789, 1 Stat. 73 (1789); William R. Casto, An Orthodox
View of the Two-Tier Analysis of Congressional Control over Federal Jurisdiction, 7 CONST.
COMMENTARY 89, 93 (1990) (arguing that the 1789 act excluded many possible heads of
federal jurisdiction in favor of state courts); Felix Frankfurter, Distribution ofJudicial Power
Between United States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL. L.Q. 499 ( 1 928) (providing a concise
history of the balance of power between the federal and state courts); see also supra note 39.
2 1 0. TH E FEDERALIST No. 82, at 460 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1 96 1 ).
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history illustrates that judge-initiated expansions of federal judicial
power are met with disdain by both Congress and the states.211 The
Torres approach invites a radical realignment in the federated nature
of the United States judicial system by allowing a large percentage of
civil suits access to the federal courts.212 This realignment is contrary to
the primary tenets of judicial federalism. For this reason, the view
should be rejected.
2.

Lack ofJudicial Competence in Foreign Affairs

The previous two critiques of the Torres approach are predicated
upon giving the approach an expansive reading. A proponent of the
view could retort that this is not the best reading of the Torres ap
proach, arguing that the approach attempts to prevent this flood of
litigation from inundating the federal courts by restricting its expan
sion of federal jurisdiction only to cases implicating important foreign
policy concerns,213 and thus enabling the approach to avoid the prag
matic and doctrinal concerns raised above. The Torres approach's ef
forts to stem this tide of litigation fails on two grounds.
First, restricting the expansion of federal jurisdiction to important
policy concerns does not alleviate the pragmatic concern.214 The Torres
approach's proposed limitation upon federal jurisdiction requires that
the federal courts determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether the in
stant litigation raises important foreign policy concerns.215 This pro
vides a strong incentive for defendants to remove to federal court, if
for no other reason than as a stalling tactic. Even if a vast majority of
cases involving foreign affairs were remanded to state court, the sheer
volume of motions to remand could swamp the federal courts.216
Second, even if this case-by-case review of motions to remove is
feasible, the j udiciary, as the Patrickson court convincingly argues, is
not well suited to make foreign policy decisions.217 "[T]he federal
211. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793) (finding
the Constitution grants federal jurisdiction to suits between a state and a citizen of another
state); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1481-84 (stat
ing the traditional view that the Eleventh Amendment was quickly passed as an expression
of outrage concerning the holding in Chisholm).
212.

See supra

Section IJ.B.1.

213. Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1997); see also Republic
of Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 352 (2d Cir. 1986) (restricting federal jurisdiction to
cases that significantly affect American foreign relations).
214.

See supra

Section IJ.B.l.

215. See Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1378 (1 1 th Cir. 1998) (finding
that the present litigation does not raise important foreign policy concerns); Marathon Oil
Co. v. Ruhrgas, A.G., 115 F.3d 315, 320 (5th Cir. 1997) (same); Torres, 113 F.3d at 543
(finding that the present litigation does raise important foreign policy concerns).
216.

See supra

217.

See

note 207.

Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795, 803-04 (9th Cir. 2001).
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courts have little context or expertise by which to analyze and address
the potential implications of a lawsuit on foreign relations."218 This
lack of competence is worsened by the fact that, when assessing the
foreign relations implications of litigation, courts seldom rely on for
eign policy authorities.219 "Rather, they usually make a simple intuitive
judgment about the foreign relations consequences of the adjudica
tion."220 These uninformed, intuitive judgments, when made on a case
by-case basis, lead to decentralized, non-uniform foreign policy proc
lamations by the federal courts.221 Such a result is perverse, as the rai
son d'etre for the federal common law of foreign relations is to prevent
differing judicial rulings in the foreign affairs arena.222
The Torres approach has led to such differing judicial rulings in
practice. In Torres itself, the Fifth Circuit, with no apparent consulta
tion from the State Department or other foreign affairs authority, con
cluded that the litigation raised important foreign policy concerns.223
The court intuited that foreign policy concerns were raised because
mining is a large part of the Peruvian economy and the government
was intimately involved in this particular mining site.224 The same Fifth
Circuit panel, less than a month later, intuited that a suit against
Germany's leading natural gas producer concerning a deal worth hun
dreds of millions of dollars involving nearly a quarter of the volume of
the North Sea's Heimdal gas field did not raise foreign policy con
cerns.225 Both cases seem to raise foreign policy concerns equally; that
is to say, both involve huge sums of money, both involve industries

218. In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litig., 100 F. Supp. 2d 31, 38
(D.D.C. 2000) (criticizing the Torres approach); see also Container Corp. of Am. v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983) ("This Court has little competence in determin
ing precisely when foreign nations will be offended by particular acts . . . . "); Chicago & S.
Air Lines, I nc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 1 11 (1948) ("[T]he very nature of ex
ecutive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial.").
219. See, e.g. , Pacheco de Perez, 139 F.3d at 1 378 (neglecting to rely upon a foreign
policy authority); Marathon Oil, 115 F.3d at 320 (same); Torres, 1 1 3 F.3d at 543 (same);
Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 352-54 (2d Cir. 1986) (same); Sequihua v.
Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61, 62-63 (S.D. Tex 1 994) (same); Grynberg Production Corp., v.
B ritish Gas, P.L.C., 817 F. Supp. 1 338, 1356-57 (E.D. Tex. 1 993) (same); Jack L. Goldsmith,
The New Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1395,
1414-15 (1999) [hereinafter Goldsmith, The New Formalism ] (arguing that courts never at
tempt to assess the content of U.S. foreign policy in such situations). 8111 see Kern v. Jeppe
sen Sanderson, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 525, 531-32 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (citing Convention on Interna
tional Civil Aviation, article 1).
220. Goldsmith,
221.

See id.

The New Formalism, supra

note 219, at 1 415.

at 1417-18.

222. See Banco Nacional de Cuba
pra note 66 and accompanying text.

v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421-27 (1964); see also su-

223. Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1997).
224.

Id.

225. Marathon Oil Co. v. Rurhgas, A.G., 1 1 5 F.3d 315, 320 (5th Cir. 1 997).
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crucial to their domestic economies and both governments protested
the litigation.226 This factual congruence leads one to view the deci
sions as inconsistent.227 The effect of the Torres approach is to give
preferential judicial treatment to certain countries based upon courts'
merely intuitive analysis of American relations with that country.
However, decisions concerning which nations are to be favored by
American foreign policy properly belong to the political branches.228
Thus, the Torres approach's attempt to limit the volume of litigation
sweeping into the federal courts via its liberal use of federal common
law of foreign relations is unworkable.
III. AN ANACHRONISM JUST IN THE NICK OF TIME: A TRADITIONAL
JURISDICTIONAL VIEW IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION
An unworkable Torres approach presents a quandary. Federal
common law of foreign relations cannot be restricted, as the
Patrickson court would have it, merely to questions concerning the
validity of the acts of foreign sovereigns. Even though this outlook
prevents illegitimate corporate flight to federal fora, established case
law compels a broader view. By the same token, federal common law
of foreign relations cannot be so broad that it destroys the balance be
tween the state and federal court systems and allows easy access to
federal rubber stamp forum non conveniens dismissals for transna
tional corporate defendants as the Torres approach does. Moreover,
an approach to the federal common law of foreign relations should
avoid the sort of j urisdictional case-by-case intuitive reasoning relied
upon by the Torres approach.
Part III argues for a way out of this quandary that fosters on the
merits defenses of corporate overseas conduct. Section III.A argues
that limiting federal common law of foreign relations to issues directly
involving the conduct of foreign sovereigns fits well with established
case law, and that, in most cases, it is easier to apply than competing
approaches. This foreign sovereign conduct approach would leave the
bulk of cases implicating foreign relations, when a sovereign is not a
party, in state court. Section III.B addresses legitimate concerns raised
by this result, arguing that indispensable party doctrine, coupled with
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), and choice of law
doctrine dispel most of them. In an effort to illustrate the effects of the

226.

Id.

at 317-320;

Torres,

113 F.3d at 541-43.

227. See Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 52, at 1695-98 (arguing that the Fifth
Circuit's decisions in Torres and Marathon Oil are inconsistent).
228. In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litig., 100 F. Supp. 2d 31, 38
(D.D.C. 2000) (stating that it is for the President and Secretary of State to determine when
the U.S. will favor one nation over another).
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foreign sovereign conduct approach, Section III.C applies it to facts of
and Torres.

Patrickson

A.

Foreign Sovereign Conduct Approach

Having rejected the jurisdictional extremes of Torres and
the scope of federal common law of foreign relations must
be reconceived. A review of the case law finds that limiting the federal
common law of foreign relations to adjudicating issues of foreign sov
ereign conduct fits well with precedent. Additionally, this view of fed
eral common law of foreign relations offers an ease of applicability for
jurisdictional purposes not afforded by competing models.
Patrickson,

1.

Scope of Established Federal Common Law of Foreign Relations
Case Law

Excluding the Torres line of cases, established case law presents a
relatively defined scope for the federal common law of foreign rela
tions. Having a foreign sovereign as a named party to a case is not
necessary or sufficient to implicate the federal common law of foreign
relations. Indeed, the federal common law of foreign relations never
provides federal subject matter jurisdiction when a foreign sovereign is
a named defendant.229 On the other hand, a foreign sovereign acting as
plaintiff will not always have its complaint governed by the federal
common law of foreign relations.230 Moreover, cases lacking a foreign
sovereign as a named party may implicate the federal common law of
foreign relations.231
The federal common law of foreign relations, regardless of the
status of the parties to the litigation, governs uniquely federal issues
raised by state causes of action. These uniquely federal interests in
clude the following: applying the act of state doctrine;232 adjudicating
229. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et. seq. (1994)
(providing jurisdictional immunity to foreign sovereigns, and entities owned by them, in
state and federal court subject to listed exceptions); see also, Argentine Republic v. Ame
rada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434-39 (1 989) (holding the Foreign Sovereign Im
munities Act is the sole method for gaining subject matter jurisdiction over a foreign sover
eign defendant).
230. See, e.g. , In re Tobacco, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 36-37 (holding that litigation involving
foreign sovereign plaintiffs seeking recovery under state law does not necessarily implicate
uniquely federal interests to be governed by federal common law).
231. See, e.g. , Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (applying federal common law of
foreign relations in an Oregon probate case between two non-sovereigns).
232. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U .S. 398, 425 (1964) (creating the act of
state doctrine and holding that federal common law of foreign relations governs its applica
tion); Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795, 799-800 (9th Cir. 2001) (arguing that the
act of state doctrine provides the outer limit of the scope of federal common law of foreign
relations); Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 352-53 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding
that the act of state doctrine is governed by federal common law of foreign relations);
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the enforceability of foreign non-judicial decrees within the United
States;233 subjecting a foreign sovereign's public policies to judicial
evaluation;234 applying customary international law;235 and resolving
diplomatic, military and immigration issues not governed by congres
sional or executive branch action.236
Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'! City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 1965) (holding that the ef
fect of an act of a foreign state "must be treated . . . as an aspect of federal law" (internal
citation omitted)).
233. See Marcos, 806 F.2d at 353 (holding that the enforceability of Filipino Executive
orders are a matter of federal law); Republic of Iraq, 353 F.2d at 50 (holding that the en
forceability of a non-judicially ordered confiscatory decree is a matter of federal law). Some
courts have gone so far as to find that the enforcement of foreign judicial judgments and de
crees should be governed by federal common law of foreign relations. See, e.g. , Tahan v.
Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 868 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding enforcement of all foreign judgments
governed by federal common law); Her Majesty Queen in Right of British Columbia v.
Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1 161, 1163 n.2 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding the enforcement of foreign tax
judgments a matter of federal law). The author of this Note chooses not to include Tahan
and Gilbertson as they appear to be aberrant, later courts have declined to follow them, and
following them would seriously erode a traditional area of state competence. See, e.g. ,
Uniform Foreign-Money Claims Act § 10 (1989) (state law controls the recognition of for
eign judgments for money).
234. See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 441 (holding that state law, even absent treaty or actions
by the federal political branches, may not be used to evaluate the policies of foreign gov
ernments); Trojan Tech., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 913-14 (3d Cir. 1990) (applying
Zschernig to a state statute, upholding the statute constitutional as it did not allow state offi
cials to comment upon, nor discriminate among, foreign nations).
235. See, e.g., First Nat'I City Bank v. Banco para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462
U.S. 611, 623 (1983) (quoting approvingly The Paquete Habana); The Paquete Habana, 175
U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is part of our law. . . . "); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d
232, 246 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that it is a "settled proposition that federal common law in
corporates [customary] international law"); In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human
Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 502 (9th Cir. 1992) ("It is . . . well settled that the law of nations is
part of federal common law."); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 193 (D. Mass. 1995)
("(l]t is well settled that the body of principles that comprise customary international law is
subsumed and incorporated by federal common law."). But see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Mod
ern Position, 1 10 HARV. L. R EV. 815 (1997) (arguing that customary international law ought
not to have the status of federal law, absent action by the executive or Congress, as it raises
serious separation of powers and federalism issues, is undemocratic, and misconstrues the
bases for federal common law). Customary international law does proscribe some conduct of
individuals as well as nation-states; e.g. , crimes against humanity and war crimes. See DAVID
J . BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 73-77 (2001). But generally speaking,
customary international law operates upon sovereigns, not individuals. See id. at 14-24.
236. See Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) (stating that some areas
of law raise such uniquely federal interests that, absent statutory or agency action, the issue
must be controlled by federal common law). The Constitution raises several areas of unique
federal interest in the foreign affairs venue. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (extending the fed
eral judicial power to cases affecting ambassadors and consuls); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3
(President retains power to receive diplomats); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (President is com
mander in chief of the armed services and may call up the state militias); U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, els. 1 1-16 (Congress has power to fund and regulate the armed forces as well as declare
war); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (Congress retains the power to control immigration); U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10 (limiting the States' ability to engage in diplomatic and military endeav
ors); Weisburd, supra note 69, at 58-60 (arguing that federal common law of foreign relations
properly controls diplomatic, military and immigration issues by constitutional assignment).
Of course, Congress so heavily legislates and ratifies treaties within this realm that it is un-
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The theme that holds these five areas together is that they all in
volve the interaction of the United States with the official conduct of
foreign sovereigns.237 The first area, the act of state doctrine, governs
the respect the United States will grant to the acts of foreign sover
eigns within the foreign sovereign's territory.238 The second area, en
forceability of non-judicial foreign decrees, governs the weight the
United States will grant to the acts of foreign sovereigns within
American territory. The third area, judicial evaluation of foreign pub
lic policy, governs the level of scrutiny applied to the policies of for
eign sovereigns. The fourth area, customary international law, primar
ily governs relations between sovereigns in the absence of treaty law
or general legal principles.239 And the fifth area, the vesting of diplo
matic, military and immigration issues exclusively in the federal gov
ernment, controls which American governmental entities may offi
cially interact with foreign sovereigns.240 This theme provides a concise
rubric for the scope of federal common law of foreign relations: fed
eral common law of foreign relations governs how the United States
reacts to the official conduct of foreign sovereigns in the absence of
congressional or executive branch action.
This view of foreign affairs, limiting the scope of federal common
law to the conduct of foreign sovereigns, is unquestioningly an anach
ronistic view of international relations. Traditionally, international law
and foreign relations were the exclusive domain of nations in their
sovereign capacities.241 This is no longer the case as non-sovereign en-

likely that the federal courts will often have to resort to federal common law to resolve is
sues of immigration, diplomatic or military concern. See Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra
note 52, at 1707.
237. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 425 ("[Issues involving] our relationships with other
members of the international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of federal
law").
238. See BEDERMAN,
doctrine.).

supra

note 235, at 196-99 (providing overview of the act of state

239. See id. at 14-24 (providing general overview of customary international law). It is
important to note that contemporary international law does have a limited applicability to
individuals. See id. at 73-77, 93-109.
240. See, e.g. , HENKIN, supra note 166, at 135 (arguing that the States have no role, con
stitutionally speaking, in foreign affairs). Of course, the States act, in a non-sovereign capac
ity, on the international stage all the time. See, e.g. , Daniel Halberstam, The Foreign Affairs
of Federal Systems: A National Perspective on the Benefits of State Participation, 46 VILL. L.
REV. 1015, 1029 n.73 (2001) (stating that in March of 2001 the several states maintained 260
overseas trade offices and representatives).
241. See BEDERMAN, supra note 235, at 1-6 (providing a brief account of the develop
ment of international law from an exclusively sovereign domain to a body of law that oper
ates directly upon individuals and non-governmental organizations as well); Goldsmith,
Federal Courts, supra note 52, at 1670 ("Foreign relations was traditionally understood to be
relations among the national governments of sovereign nation-states.").
.
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tities, such as the United Nations,242 and individuals243 are directly
subject to international law and integrally involved in foreign affairs.
Moreover, "trade, investment, technology and energy transfers, envi
ronmental and social issues . . . migratory and commuting labor [ca
pacity], drug traffic, and epidemics" often dominate foreign affairs
agendas, while the decrees of foreign chief executives and the niceties
of customary international law often pale in shadow of these other
concerns.244
This anachronistic perspective is not a mark against the foreign
sovereign conduct approach. There is no doctrinal principle that re
quires the federal common law of foreign relations to track innova
tions in actual international affairs, while there are overwhelming con
stitutional principles that require the bulk of litigation to remain in
state court.245 As there must be a clear limit to the range of the federal
common law of foreign relations, lest every case with an international
element be subject to federal common law,246 the federal common law
of foreign relations must lag behind the ever-expanding scope of in
ternational affairs.
2.

Ease of Administrability

The foreign sovereign conduct approach is easier for courts to ap
ply than the Torres approach because this perspective, with its five ar
eas of applicability, is fairly well defined as compared with the merely
intuited boundaries of the Torres approach. The first and second areas
of federal common law of foreign relations, the act of state doctrine
and the enforceability of non-judicial foreign decrees, are almost me
chanically applicable for j urisdictional purposes. The court need only
satisfy itself that the foreign state actually engaged in the act or made
the decree pleaded. The third area, limiting the scope of state evalua
tion of a foreign sovereign's public policy, is easily applied for jurisdic
tional purposes. A reading of the state statute in question, or a quick
review of how it is applied, should readily reveal whether the state is
normatively evaluating the public policy of foreign sovereigns. The
fifth area, federal control of immigration, military and diplomatic af
fairs, is a j urisdictional slam-dunk. These are constitutionally assigned
to the federal government, placing federal subject matter jurisdiction
beyond question.
242. See Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the U nited Nations, 1949
I.C.J. 174 (establishing the international legal personality of the United Nations).
243. See BEDERMAN, supra note 235, at 73-77, 93-109 (discussing the international
criminal law applicable to individuals and international human rights protections).
244. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 52, at 1671.
245. See supra Section 11.B.l.
246. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
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The fourth area, customary international law, provides a partial
exception to this ease of administrability advantage. Determining
whether binding customary international law exists on a particular is
sue requires voluminous compilation of past practice of nations and
case law from numerous authorities.247 Nevertheless, the foreign sov
ereign conduct approach remains superior to the Torres approach on
this score. Even when the foreign sovereign conduct approach pres
ents taxing problems, such as determining past practice of nations and
compiling customary international case law, the difficulties presented
are judicially cognizable ones as opposed to the Torres approach's in
tuitive foreign policy judgments. Further, the foreign sovereign con
duct approach constructs a frame to contain future expansions of fed
eral common law of foreign relations beyond the five established
areas, limiting the evolution of the federal common law to areas where
a foreign sovereign's conduct is at issue. The Torres approach provides
no such concrete limiting principle.
The foreign sovereign conduct model surpasses the only other
competing model for limiting the scope of the federal common law of
foreign relations.248 Professor Goldsmith's motive review model holds
that the federal common law of foreign relations should apply only to
prevent state action motivated by a state's desire to conduct its own
foreign affairs.249 Such a view comports well with the Zschernig line of
cases.250 Nevertheless, Goldsmith's view is inferior to the foreign sov
ereign conduct approach on two counts. First, the motive review
model does not have the ease of administrability that the foreign sov
ereign conduct model has for jurisdictional purposes. The motive re
view model requires a case-by-case review, similar to the Torres ap-

247. See The Paquete Habana, 1 75 U.S. 677, 686-714 (1 900) (taking nearly thirty pages
to prove that international law protects non-combatant fishing boats in time of war);
BEDERMAN, supra note 235, at 1 6-17 (noting the difficulty encountered in establishing
norms of customary international law).
248. There are two other potential models. They are not directly addressed as they do
not present viable alternatives to the foreign sovereign conduct approach. First, Professor
Weisburd suggests limiting the scope of federal common law of foreign relations to diplo
matic, military and immigration issues. Weisburd's approach is incorporated into the foreign
sovereign conduct approach. See supra note 236. These issues are so dominated by positive
law that "federal common law of foreign relations so conceived would have very little practi
cal scope." Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 52, at 1707 (criticizing Professor
Weisburd's view). Second, federal common law of foreign relations could be restricted to
those cases that the executive identifies as impacting the foreign relations of the United
States. See id. at 1708. Such a view has several flaws. Id. at 1709-10. Chief among them:
Congress has not delegated such law making power to the president; such a position raises
serious due process concerns and the Court has consistently resisted such an approach. Id.
Not surprisingly, "no one has seriously proposed that the executive suggestion replace the
federal common law of foreign relations." Id. at 1710.
249. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 52, at 1711.
250. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1 968) (holding Oregon probate law that evalu
ated the public policy of Soviet-bloc countries unconstitutional).
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proach, to determine if the state legislature was improperly moti
vated.251 Moreover, determining legislative motives is notoriously dif
ficult.252 The foreign sovereign conduct approach, on the other hand,
often offers bright line jurisdictional tests. Second, the motive review
model excludes the other four established areas of federal common
law of foreign relations. Such a view is simply inconsistent with en
trenched case law.253 Goldsmith himself admits as much.254 Addressing
Goldsmith's arguments against the whole concept of federal common
law of foreign relations is beyond the scope of this Note.255 As the goal
of this inquiry is to provide the best view of what the law is, not what it
ought to be, it will have to suffice to say that
Goldsmith's exclusion of the remaining four well-established areas of
federal common law of foreign relations is not regarded by most
authorities as an accurate portrayal of current law.256
B.

Remaining Concerns and Remedies

Following the foreign sovereign conduct approach, most defen
dants seeking federal question jurisdiction by claiming that vital sov
ereign and economic interests are at issue will find themselves in state
court. Nonetheless, leaving cases that strike at vital interests of foreign
nations in state court does raise some legitimate concerns. For exam
ple, it is often stated that state courts may issue parochial or divergent
rulings in such cases.257 This Section argues that the indispensable
party258 and choice of law doctrines259 mitigate these fears.

251. See supra Section 11.B.2. (discussing difficulty of the case-by-case jurisdiction re
view employed by the Torres approach).
252. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) ("It is a familiar principle of
constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on
the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive . . . . Inquiries into congressional motives or
purposes are a hazardous matter."); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest For the Original
Understanding, in MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: A READER 132, 136-39 (John H .
Garvey & T . Alexander Aleinikoff eds., 4th ed. 1999) (discussing difficulty o f discovering
legislative motives and intentions).
253.

See supra

notes 214-216 and accompanying text.

254. See Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 52, at 1632-1641 (discussing the scope of
federal common law of foreign relations case law under the traditional view).
255. Goldsmith argues the federal common law of foreign relations cannot be supported
from a historical perspective. Moreover, he argues that the doctrine is undemocratic, raising
serious political question doctrine and federalism concerns. Id. at 1713-15 (summarizing his
critique of the federal common law of foreign relations).
256.

See supra

note 166.

257. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964) (stating this
concern).
258. See Rosencranz & Campbell, supra note 5, at 200-05 (noting that indispensable
party doctrine coupled with the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act may halt litigation im
pacting non-party foreign sovereigns).
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Indispensable party doctrine protects many of the interests a for
eign sovereign might have concerning state court litigation. A foreign
sovereign, though not a party to a private transnational litigation in
state court, may be so wrapped up in the transactions leading up to the
litigation that it qualifies as an indispensable party. Every state has
some formulation of indispensable party doctrine similar to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 19.260 The federal rule provides that a party is
indispensable if (1) in the party's absence, complete relief cannot oth
erwise be accorded to the present parties, or the absent party claims
an interest in the litigation that may subject the present parties to in
consistent, or multiple judgments, or a judgment in the present litiga
tion may, as a practical matter, impair the absent party's interest; (2)
and the court determines in equity and good conscience that the litiga
tion should not proceed without the absent party.261 Failure to join an
indispensable party provides a court with reason to dismiss.262
In most private transnational cases, parties will not be able to join
a foreign sovereign as an indispensable party, thus protecting the in
terest of foreign sovereigns by providing state courts with grounds for
dismissal. The FSIA is the sole means of acquiring subject matter ju
risdiction over a foreign sovereign defendant.263 Although the PISA
does provide a few exceptions,264 it generally excludes state and fed
eral courts from taking subject matter jurisdiction over foreign sover
eign defendants.265 Thus, non-party foreign sovereigns may not be
joined in most private transnational litigation. If the interests of the
foreign sovereign are such that it will be prejudiced by the continua-

259. See Garvey, supra note 69, at 498 (stating that traditional choice of law principles
would often result in the application of foreign law in such cases, thereby avoiding the con
cerns of state parochialism); James A.R. Nafziger, Resolving International Conflict of Laws
by Federal and State Law, 2 PACE YEARBOOK OF INT'L L. 67 (1990) (arguing that as interna
tional litigation becomes more routine, the argument for applying traditional conflict of law
analyses strengthens).
260. See generally John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts:
A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367 (1986) (provid
ing summaries of the similarities and differences of the federal and state rules of civil proce
dure).
261 . FED. R. CIV. P. 19.
262.

See Rosencranz

& Campbell, supra note 5, at 200.

263. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434-39
(1989) (holding that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is the sole method for gaining
jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign defendant).
264. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1994 & Supp. 2001) (courts do have subject matter jurisdiction
over foreign sovereigns if the sovereign has waived the immunity, is involved in commercial
activities, is taking property in the United States, is acquiring a gift by succession in the
United States, has committed torts in the United States, was involved in specified maritime
activities, or engaged in or sponsored terrorist activity).
265. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq. (1994) (providing jurisdictional immunity to foreign sover
eigns, and entities owned by them, in state and federal court subject to listed exceptions).
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tion of the case in its absence, state courts have reason to dismiss the
case.266
On the other hand, if a foreign sovereign meets one of the excep
tions listed by the FSIA (e.g., by engaging in commercial activity267)
and it is joined into state court litigation, the foreign sovereign "has an
absolute right of removal to the federal courts."268 If a foreign state's
interests are so intertwined with those of state court litigants that it is
joined in the litigation, it is protected from potentially parochial state
adjudication by removal to federal court.
Even if a private transnational case, with a fact pattern similar to
Patrickson, remained in state court, choice of law doctrine protects the
interests of affected foreign sovereigns. Although the states employ a
wide range of choice of law doctrines,269 generally they are "generous
about the relative strength and acceptability of a foreign state's inter
est as reflected, for example, in California's comparative impairment
technique."270 Indeed, in fact patterns such as those found in Torres
and Patrickson
where the plaintiffs are foreign citizens suing in tort
for injuries that occurred in their home country and foreign law favors
the instate defendant - most states will apply the substantive law of
the foreign state.271 Thus, even if a foreign state's interests are not so
commingled with those of private transnational state court litigants as
to be an indispensable party or to be joined, the foreign sovereign's
interests will often be safeguarded by applying its substantive law in
the litigation.
Finally, if a foreign sovereign is unhappy that a suit, to which it is
not a party, is proceeding in state court, it can seek to intervene in the
litigation, thereby triggering an absolute right of removal to federal
-

266. See FED . R. Clv. P. 19(b) ("The factors to be considered by the court [in dismiss
ing] include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be
prejudicial to the person . . . . ").
267. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1994).
268. Kern v. Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc., 867 F. Supp 525, 530 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (citing 28
§ 1441(d)).

u.s.c.

269. See WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING
CONFLICT OF LA ws 193-266 (2d ed. 1993) (providing a survey of the modern state law ap
proaches to choice of law problems). One does not escape these differing choice of law doc
trines by going to federal court. Should such a choice of law issue be governed by federal
common law in federal question jurisdiction, the federal court would likely appropriate state
law as the federal rule of decision. See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Serv., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991)
("[F]ederal courts should incorporate state law as the federal rule of decision, unless applica
tion of the particular state law in question would frustrate specific objectives of the federal
programs.") (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Moreover, federal courts sit
ting in diversity jurisdiction apply the choice of law rules of the state in which they sit.
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
270. Nafziger, supra note 259, at 73.
271 . For example, this is clearly the result under a lex loci delicti regime. See RICHMAN
& REYNOLDS, supra note 269, at 171-74. It is also the result under a comparative impair
ment regime as it presents a false conflict. See id. at 221-23.
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court.272 Most states have a civil procedure provision comparable to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24.273 Rule 24 allows non-litigants to
intervene when the intervenor has an interest relating to the subject
matter of the suit, the intervenor, as a practical matter, is likely to be
impaired in this interest by the disposition of the suit, and the existing
parties do not adequately represent the intervenor's interests.274 If a
foreign sovereign has legitimate interests that a suit in state court is
likely to impact negatively, it may seek to intervene.275 Should the
court grant the motion to intervene,276 the foreign sovereign can pro
tect its interests by its absolute right to remove to federal court and to
seek a federal forum non conveniens dismissal.277
C.

Patrickson and Torres Revisited

In practice, the foreign sovereign conduct approach will leave most
transnational cases in state court. By way of illustration, consider how
the Patrickson and Torres cases would fare under the foreign sover
eign conduct approach. Plaintiffs in Patrickson brought state tort
claims against Dole Food for personal injuries caused by Dole Food's
use of dangerous pesticides.278 Nothing in the facts, as laid out by the
court, suggests that the several foreign nations in which the plaintiffs
resided were involved in the transactions leading up to the use of the
pesticides.279 This fact ought to lead a court to believe that the plain
tiff's state law claims do not raise issues governed by the federal com
mon law of foreign relations.280 The case would remain in Hawaii state
court, then, because the complaint fails both the Holmes and neces
sary construction tests.281 Assuming that the economies of the Central
272.

Kern, 867 F.

Supp at 530.

273.

See JACK

H. FRI EDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 374 (3d ed. 1999).

274.

See FED.

R. Civ. P. 24; FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 273, at § 6.10.

275.

Id.

276. An intervenor may seek to intervene as of right or permissively.
FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 273, at 374.

See

277. Kern, 867 F. Supp. at 530. Many foreign sovereigns may decline to take this strategy
as it involves a degree of risk, because the foreign sovereign must allow itself to become a
defendant. If the federal court refuses, as is unlikely, to grant a forum non conveniens dis
missal, the foreign sovereign could be found liable for damages.
278. Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 2001).
279.

Id.

280. The validity of Panama's, et al., actions within its territory are not at issue, see
supra note 232, the extraterritorial validity of Panama's, et al., actions are not at issue, see
supra note 233, Hawaiian law does not require a normative evaluation of Panama's, et al.,
public policy, see supra note 234, there are not issues of customary international law raised,
see supra note 235, nor are issues of military, diplomatic or immigration law raised, see supra
note 236.
281.

See supra

Section l.A.l.
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American nations involved in Patrickson heavily depend upon agricul
ture, the Patrickson litigation may very well strike at vital economic
interests of these nations. These interests should be adequately pro
tected in Hawaiian court by the choice of Panamanian, Costa Rican,
Ecuadorian, or Guatemalan substantive law.
The Torres case presents a more complicated picture. Plaintiffs in
Torres brought state tort claims against SPCC, alleging personal inju
ries from sulfur dioxide emissions.282 Unlike the governments involved
in Patrickson, the government of Peru was involved in SPCC's mining
operation.283 Nonetheless, based on the facts presented, the plaintiffs'
claims do not appear to implicate issues governed by federal common
law of foreign relations.284 As the complaint appears to fail both the
Holmes and necessary construction tests, the case should remain in
Texas state court.285 Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether the state court
would take the case to trial. Peru's intimate involvement with SPCC's
mining operation - including ownership of the refinery from 19751994, during which time many of the plaintiffs were allegedly injured286
- could lead a court to conclude that Peru is an indispensable party.
This would provide the court with reason to dismiss the case.287 On the
other hand, it is possible that the commercial activities exception to
the FSIA would apply to Peru's conduct.288 Should this occur, and if a
Texas court could gain personal jurisdiction over Peru, Peru could be
joined.289 In such an event, Peru would have an absolute right of re
moval to federal court.290 If Peru was as involved in the transactions
leading up to the Torres case as the Fifth Circuit intimates, there is lit
tle reason to fear that the foreign sovereign conduct approach would
leave Peru's interests to the mercies of a potentially parochial Texas
trial court. 291
282. Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 1 13 F.3d 540, 541 (5th Cir. 1997).
283. Id. at 543 (Peru owns the land being mined, owns the mineral, extracted, grants
SPCC concessions for a fee, and owned the refinery itself until 1994).
284. That is to say, the validity of Peru's actions within its territory are not at issue, see
note 232; the extraterritorial validity of Peru's action are not at issue, see supra note
233; Texas law does not require a normative evaluation of Peru's public policy, see supra
note 234; there are not issues of customary international law raised, see supra note 235, nor
are issues of military, diplomatic or immigration law raised, see supra note 236.

supra

285.

See supra

286.

Torres,

Section I.Al.

287.

See supra note

262 and accompanying text.

288.

See supra note

267 and accompanying text.

289.

See id.

290.

See supra

113 F.3d at 543.

note 268 and accompanying text.

291. If the foreign sovereign conduct approach were adopted, corporate defendants
such as Dole Food and SPCC, presumably, would take actions to minimize the impact of this
approach. Such actions might include the following: first, corporate defendants could seek to
persuade state courts or legislatures to adopt the federal standard for forum non conveniens
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CONCLUSION
American multinational corporations, following the Torres ap
proach, have used the federal common law of foreign relations to
manufacture federal question jurisdiction to escape on the merits de
fenses of state tort actions brought by foreign plaintiffs. Contrary to
the position taken in the Torres approach, the federal common law of
foreign relations is best understood as not providing federal question
jurisdiction in such cases. In reaching this conclusion, the Patrickson
challenge to Torres was considered and rejected as attacking merely a
straw man version of the Torres approach. The Torres approach was
rejected as well, because it was unable to overcome damning prag
matic and doctrinal critiques. In its place, this Note argued that the
foreign sovereign conduct approach provides the most accurate depic
tion of the scope of federal common law of foreign relations. This view
leaves most private transnational litigation in state courts by restrict
ing the scope of federal common law of foreign relations to issues re
quiring the United States to react to the official conduct of foreign
sovereigns in the absence of congressional or executive branch action.
Finally, state courts were found to provide numerous protections for
the legitimate interests of foreign sovereigns. In a world where en
gaging in business overseas is becoming the rule rather than the excep
tion, limiting access to federal rubber stamp forum non conveniens
dismissals would foster transnational corporate responsibility. Ameri
can multinational corporations should not be able to escape the obli
gation to present on the merits defenses in American courts simply
because the transactions leading up to litigation happened to occur
abroad.

dismissals. See Rosencranz & Campbell, supra note 5, at 188 n.266 (noting that several states
have adopted the federal forum non conveniens standard). Second, corporate defendants
could restructure their presence overseas so that American parent corporations are not li
able for the acts of their overseas subsidiaries. See, e.g. , H. Lowell Brown, Parent-Subsidiary
Liability Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 1 (1998) (outlining
the corporate practice of forming foreign subsidiary corporations to limit liability and the
effect of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act upon these practices). Third, corporate defen
dants could attempt to use forum selection clauses, selecting Central American fora, in their
contracts with foreign workers. See, e.g. , Ryan Kelly McLemore, Comment, Forum-Selection
Clauses and Seaman Personal Injury: A Modern A nalytical Framework with International
Emphasis, 25 TUL. MAR. L.J. 327, 328-30 (2000) (discussing the use of forum selection

clauses for employees in the international shipping business to avoid unfavorable fora).

